Morrisett, Greg, Walker, David, Crary, Karl, & Glew, Neal. (1999). From System F to typed assembly language. ACM transactions on programming languages and systems, 21(3), 527--568. An earlier version appeared in the 1998 Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages. Home/Search Document Details and Download
Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
Secure Information Flow via Linear Continuations - Zdancewic, Myers (2002) (9 citations) (Correct)
....previous work has considered information ow properties in the source language. However, source level analysis is not enough: Compiler transformations (or bugs ) may introduce new security holes. One appealing option is to verify the output of the compiler, for instance via typed assembly language [26] or proof carrying code [31] This paper proposes the use of continuation passing style (CPS) translations [14, 18, 38] as a means of studying noninterference in imperative, higher order languages. This approach has two bene ts. First, CPS expresses higher order programs in a form that is ....
....This approach has two bene ts. First, CPS expresses higher order programs in a form that is amenable to proving noninterference results. Our proof of security can be seen as a generalization of previous work by Smith and Volpano [40] Second, CPS is useful for representing low level programs [4, 26], which opens up the possibility of verifying the security of compiler output. We observe in the next section that a naive approach to providing security types for an imperative CPS language yields a system that is too conservative: many secure programs (in the noninterference sense) are ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Morrisett, G., D. Walker, K. Crary, and N. Glew: 1999, `From System F to Typed Assembly Language'. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 21(3), 528-569.
Language-Based Information-Flow Security - Sabelfeld, Myers (2003) (80 citations) (Correct)
....low level of confidentiality for data) such as Java applets or ActiveX components. Certifying compilation [118] is an attractive way to generate machine code that is annotated with the necessary information to perform static validation. Java bytecode verification [24] and typed assembly language [28] (primarily used to guarantee memory safety) are examples of this approach. Low level languages have not received much attention in studies of secure information flow. One difficulty with checking information flow in low level languages is that useful information about program structure is lost ....
....at the machine code level [120] Ordered linear continuation types enforce a stack discipline that permits a high precision analysis. Another worthwhile direction for future work is adapting techniques for the security of machine code to information flow: for example, typed assembly languages [28] that guarantee machine code does not violate type safety, and proofcarrying code [30] 121] where a proof that the program satisfies a security policy is distributed with the code and is checked before execution. C. Abstraction Violating Attacks It is inevitable that the model of the attacker ....
G. Morrisett, D. Walker, K. Crary, and N. Glew, "From System F to typed assembly language," ACM TOPLAS, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 528--569, May 1999.
Secure Information Flow via Linear Continuations - Zdancewic, Myers (2001) (9 citations) (Correct)
....work has considered information flow properties in the source language. However, source level analysis is not enough: Compiler transformations (or bugs ) may introduce new security holes. One appealing option is to verify the output of the compiler, for instance via typed assembly language [22] or proof carrying code [26] This paper proposes the use of continuation passing style (CPS) translations [11, 16, 32] as a means of studying noninterference in imperative, higher order languages. This approach has two benefits. First, CPS expresses higher order programs in a form that is ....
....This approach has two benefits. First, CPS expresses higher order programs in a form that is amenable to proving noninterference results. Our proof of security can be seen as a generalization of previous work by Smith and Volpano [34] Second, CPS is useful for representing low level programs [4, 22], which opens up the possibility of verifying the security of compiler output. We observe in the next section that a naive approach to providing security types for an imperative CPS language yields a system that is too conservative: many secure programs (in the noninterference sense) are ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Morrisett, G., D. Walker, K. Crary, and N. Glew: 1999, `From System F to Typed Assembly Language'. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 21(3), 528--569.
Certifying Compilation and Run-time Code Generation - Hornof, Jim (1999) (33 citations) (Correct)
....these concerns through another programming language technique, certifying compilation. 1.2. Certifying compilation A certifying compiler takes a source language program and produces object code and a certificate that may help to show that the object code satisfies certain desirable properties (Morrisett et al. 1998; Necula and Lee, 1998) A separate component called the verifier examines the object code and certificate and determines whether the object code actually satisfies the properties. A wide range of properties can be verified, including memory safety (unallocated portions of memory are not ....
....ensure safety. This makes our system usable as the basis of security critical applications like active networks and mobile code systems. 1.3. The Cyclone compiler The Cyclone compiler is built on two existing systems, the Tempo specializer (Noel et al. 1998) and the Popcorn certifying compiler (Morrisett et al. 1998). It has three phases, shown in Fig. 1. The first phase transforms a type safe C program into a Cyclone program that uses run time code generation. It starts by applying the static analyses of the Tempo system to a C program and context information that specifies which function arguments are ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Morrisett, G., D. Walker, K. Crary, and N. Glew: 1998, `From System F to Typed Assembly Language'. In: Conference Record of POPL '98: The 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages. San Diego, California, pp. 85--97.
Under consideration for publication in J. Functional.. - Karl Crary Aleksey Self-citation (Karl) (Correct)
No context found.
Morrisett, Greg, Walker, David, Crary, Karl, & Glew, Neal. (1999). From System F to typed assembly language. ACM transactions on programming languages and systems, 21(3), 527--568. An earlier version appeared in the 1998 Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages.
JFP 15 (2): 249--291, 2005. c - Cambridge University Press (2005) Self-citation (Crary) (Correct)
No context found.
Morrisett, G., Walker, D., Crary, K. and Glew, N. (1999) From System F to typed assembly language. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. & Syst. 21(3), 527--568.
Language-Based Information-Flow Security - Sabelfeld, Myers (2003) (80 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
G. Morrisett, D. Walker, K. Crary, and N. Glew, "From System F to typed assembly language," ACM TOPLAS, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 528--569, May 1999.
Attacking Malicious Code: A Report to the Infosec Research Council - McGraw, al. (2000) (5 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
G. Morrisett et al., "From System-F to Typed Assembly Language," ACM Trans. Programming Languages and Systems, Vol., 21, No. 3, May 1999, pp. 528--569; www.cs.cornell.edu/talc.
Online articles have much greater impact More about CiteSeer.IST Add search form to your site Submit documents Feedback
CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC