Peter Cramton and Jesse A. Schwartz. Collusive bidding in the FCC spectrum auctions. Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy, 1(1), 2002. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Spectrum Auctions - Cramton (2001) (3 citations) Self-citation (Peter) (Correct)
....license holder exercises its substantial market power in the resale of the license (Cramton et al. 1987) For this reason, it is important to get the assignment right the first time. Moreover, efficient auctions tend to raise substantial revenues, especially when resale is possible (Ausubel and Cramton 1999). Much of the research on spectrum auction design has focused on the Personal Communication Services (PCS) auctions in the US. Below I summarize several of the important issues, and the FCC s ultimate conclusion. These issues are discussed in several papers (e.g. Cramton 1997, McMillan 1994, ....
....auction. Certainly, for licenses that are close substitutes, the simultaneous ascending auction has generated near uniform pr ices for similar items. However, the incentives for demand reduction and collusive bidding likely are more pronounced in an ascending version of the uniform price auction (Cramton and Schwartz 1999, Ausubel and Schwartz 1999) 1 To illustrate this, consider a simple example with two identical goods and two risk neutral bidders. Suppose that to each bidder the marginal value of winning one item is the same as the marginal value of winning a second item. These values are assumed independent ....
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Cramton, Peter and Jesse Schwartz (1999), "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Working Paper, University of Maryland.
The Ascending Auction Paradox - Ausubel, Schwartz (1999) (1 citation) Self-citation (Schwartz) (Correct)
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Cramton, Peter and Jesse Schwartz (1998a), "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Working Paper, University of Maryland.
Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions - Cramton, Schwartz (2000) (10 citations) Self-citation (Peter Schwartz) (Correct)
....revenue was not the FCC s top priority (efficiency was) it is nevertheless important for a government with distortionary taxes to raise as much money as possible from nondistortionary sources. Moreover, revenue and efficiency are closely linked in markets where resale is permitted (Ausubel and Cramton 1999). Collusion can be mitigated in the simultaneous ascending auction by appropriately enhancing the particular rules of the auction. For example, limiting bids to three significant digits eliminates code bidding and makes bidding easier, since bidders do not have to waste resources determining what ....
....auction, since it was the focus of the FCC and DOJ investigations. Moreover, because of the large number of licenses (3493 = 1,479) and the fact that it was less competitive than either the AB or C auctions, the opportunities for bid signaling loomed large. We begin by reviewing the evidence from Cramton and Schwartz (1999), hereafter CS. CS find that bidders attempted to use code bids to win 23 licenses, but for only 12 licenses were these code bids successful. The definition of success is that the code bidder placed the winning bid on the license within five rounds of the latest code bid. Usually, as is the case ....
Cramton, Peter and Jesse Schwartz. 1999. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Working Paper, University of Maryland.
A Review of ISO New England 's Proposed Market Rules - Cramton, Wilson (1998) Self-citation (Peter) (Correct)
....is broad and abstracts from many of the details of implementation. Because of the level of abstraction, our recommendations must be viewed as tentative. It will be important for ISO New England to monitor closely the markets in the early months to identify and correct problems as they appear. 1 Cramton: peter cramton.umd.edu, 301) 405 6987; Wilson: rwilson stanford.edu, 650) 723 8620. This report was commissioned by ISO New England. The views expressed are our own. Market Design Inc. 1998. Cramton and Wilson Review of Market Rules September 9, 1998 2 Our recommendations stem from the following critique of the proposed ....
Cramton, Peter and Jesse Schwartz (1998a), "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Working Paper, University of Maryland.
Bug Auctions: Vulnerability Markets Reconsidered - Ozment (2004) (1 citation) (Correct)
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Peter Cramton and Jesse A. Schwartz. Collusive bidding in the FCC spectrum auctions. Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy, 1(1), 2002.
On Cheating in Sealed-Bid Auctions - Porter, Shoham (2003) (Correct)
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P. Cramton and J. Schwartz, Collusive bidding in the fcc spectrum auctions, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 1 (2002).
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