Dan Levin and James L. Smith. Equilibrium in auctions with entry. American Economic Review, 84(3):585--599, June 1994. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
Auction Design with Costly Preference Elicitation - Parkes (2003) (3 citations) (Correct)
....example costs of bid preparation and information acquisition. However, almost all models assume that all participation decisions are made as a one shot decision before an auction starts, and the models cannot capture the important idea that agents may continue to incur costs as an auction proceeds [24, 38, 19, 26, 40]. One insight from this literature is that it can be useful for a seller to explicitly restrict participation in settings with costly participation, because this can increase actual participation because it increases the expected surplus to agents that do decide to participate in the auction. ....
Levin, D. and J. L. Smith: 1994, `Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry'. American Economic Review 64, 585--599.
The Optimality of Being Efficient - Ausubel, Cramton (1999) (3 citations) (Correct)
....on the Coasean critiques of the optimal auction program. Other critiques strengthen our conclusion. For example, when one recognizes that bidder participation is affected by the auction design, then the case for an efficient auction improves. McAfee and McMillan (1987) Harstad (1990, 1993) and Levin and Smith (1994, 1995, 1996) provide justification why a revenue maximizing seller should care about efficiency. With endogenous bidder participation and symmetric bidders, efficiency and revenue maximization are equivalent. Bulow and Klemperer (1996) demonstrate that if a reserve price discourages even a single ....
Levin, Dan and James L. Smith (1994), "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, 84, 585599.
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions - Ausubel, Cramton (1996) (14 citations) (Correct)
....of simultaneous sealedbid auctions for heterogeneous items. Ausubel (1997) considers ascending bid auctions whose static representations correspond to the Vickrey auction. Several other papers in the literature make points which are important to the current analysis. Harstad (1990, 1993) and Levin and Smith (1994, 1995, 1996) provide justification why even a revenuemaximizing seller should care about efficiency. With endogenous bidder participation and symmetric bidders, efficiency and revenue maximization are equivalent. Bulow and Klemperer (1996) demonstrate that if a reserve price discourages even a ....
....in the seller s optimal auction is the truncation of sales below the reserve price r. Even this distortion is eliminated if we make the more realistic assumption that the set of bidders is not fixed, but varies based on the bidders rational decisions to participate (Harstad 1990, 1993, and Levin and Smith 1994). An attempt by the seller to extract additional revenues by setting a positive reserve discourages participation, which ultimately reduces revenues. Moreover, even if the seller wished to set a binding reserve price, the Coase (1972) conjecture about the durable goods monopolist can be ....
Levin, Dan and James L. Smith (1994), "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, 84, 585599.
Optimal Search Auctions - Jacques Cr Emer (Correct)
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Dan Levin and James L. Smith. Equilibrium in auctions with entry. American Economic Review, 84(3):585--599, June 1994.
Bug Auctions: Vulnerability Markets Reconsidered - Ozment (2004) (1 citation) (Correct)
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Dan Levin and James L. Smith. Equilibrium in auctions with entry. The American Economic Review, 84(3):585--599, 1994. 22
Multi-Stage Information Acquisition in Auction Design - Kyna Fong To (2003) (1 citation) (Correct)
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D. Levin and J.L. Smith, Equilibrium in auctions with entry, American Economic Review 64 (1994), 585--599.
Auction Design with Costly Preference Elicitation - Parkes (2003) (3 citations) (Correct)
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Levin, D. and J. L. Smith: 1994, `Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry'. American Economic Review 64, 585--599.
Endogenous Entry and Self-selection in Private Value.. - Palfrey, Pevnitskaya (2003) (Correct)
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Levin, Dan and James L. Smith (1994) Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry. American Economic Review, Volume 84, Issue 3, June: 585-599
The Economics of Timbes Auctions in Southern Ontario - Sareen (2000) (Correct)
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Levin, D. and J.L. Smith, 1996, Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry. American Economic Review 84, 585-599.
The Economics of Timber Auctions in Southern Ontario - Sareen (2000) (Correct)
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Levin, D. and J.L. Smith, 1996, Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry. American Economic Review 84, 585-599.
Auctioning Securities - Ausubel, Cramton (1998) (5 citations) (Correct)
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Levin, Dan and James L. Smith (1994), "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, 84, 585599.
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