| S. Bengio, G. Brassard, Y. Desmedt, C. Goutier and J.J. Quisquater: Secure Implementation of Identification Systems, Journal of Cryptology, 1991 (4): 175-- 183. |
....key. Next, the attacker is denied any further access to this black box prover. The identification scheme is called secure against adaptive impersonation attacks if the attacker is still unable to impersonate the prover (execute the prover s part of the protocol, facing an honest verifier) In [4] a weakness of identification schemes proposed until then was exposed. There, the authors explained how a malicious man in the middle V may abuse his conversations with an honest prover P to misrepresent himself as P to yet another verifier V . The attack is not by cryptographic ingenuity. But, ....
....pretending to be a verifier himself, V actually forwards V s challenges to P and forwards P s replies to V . Thus, while P is under the impression that he is identifying himself to V , he is actually identifying himself to V , to the possible advantage of V . A remedy suggested in [4] has the prover and verifier (rather the devices that represent them) isolate themselves physically from the outside world. A Faraday s cage could be a suitable implementation. However, for identification over networks, for instance, this measure seems not to be useful. We present a simple method ....
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S. Bengio, G. Brassard, Y. Desmedt, C. Goutier and J.J. Quisquater: Secure Implementation of Identification Systems, Journal of Cryptology, 1991 (4): 175-- 183.
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