P. Devanbu and S. Stubblebine. Stack and queue integrity on hostile platforms. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 26(2):100-108, 2000.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....checkers secure against active adversaries. We have described how an on chip trusted cache can be used to significantly improve the e#ciency of the log hash scheme, and also described how the scheme can be generalized to a hierarchical scheme for further e#ciency improvement. Recent papers, 7] [5], 11] 10] describe systems in which a trusted program, running in a trusted computing base (TCB) uses hash trees to maintain the integrity of data stored on an untrusted storage. The untrusted storage is typically some arbitrarily large, easily accessible, bulk store in which the program ....

P. T. Devanbu and S. G. Stubblebine. Stack and queue integrity on hostile platforms. Software Engineering, 28(1):100--108, 2002.

....Shapiro and Vingralek [14] address the problem of managing persistent state in DRM systems. Because of the large overhead of computing a MAC for each memory reference, they discount the possibility of securing volatile storage. They assume that volatile memory is inside the security perimeter. In [7] allusions are made to a smartcard system that would use a hash tree with large pages of RAM at its leaves, combined with caching of pages in internal memory. Their discussion, however is strongly directed towards smartcard applications, and they do not appear to consider caching nodes of the hash ....

P. T. Devanbu and S. G. Stubblebine. Stack and queue integrity on hostile platforms. Software Engineering, 28(1):100--108, 2002.

....integrity of the data and detect such attacks, although a full description of this countermeasure is out of the scope of the paper. 6 Related Work Many researchers have investigated the problem of providing secrecy and integrity when using an untrusted file server or external untrusted memory [5, 12, 1, 6]. But as far as we know, no previous work has provided a solution for searching on encrypted data. Secure multi party computation and oblivious functions are also intensely studied (see, e.g. 14, 8] We believe there could be a solution to the problem of searching on encrypted data using ....

Premkumar T. Devanbu and Stuart G. Stubblebine. Stack and queue integrity on hostile platforms. In Proceeding of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1998.

....specially armored. 10.4. Other Related Work In addition to general software protection, a number of other related work has implications in software security. Devanbu and Stubblebine proposed a mechanism to protect the integrity of data structures (e.g. stacks and queues) on hostile platforms [22]. Their method uses a digital signature chain, starting from an initial signature that is stored on a trusted device, to verify the integrity of the data and data operations. Each data item is stored alongside a signature that is computed by the trusted device. A signature checking operation by ....

P. Devanbu and S. Stubblebine. "Stack And Queue Integrity On Hostile Platforms". Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, May 1998.

....integrity of the data and detect such attacks, although a full description of this countermeasure is out of the scope of the paper. 6 Related Work Many researchers have investigated the problem of providing secrecy and integrity when using an untrusted file server or external untrusted memory [5, 12, 1, 6]. But as far as we know, no previous work has provided a solution for searching on encrypted data. Secure multi party computation and oblivious functions are also intensely studied (see, e.g. 14, 8] We believe there could be a solution to the problem of searching on encrypted data using ....

Premkumar T. Devanbu and Stuart G. Stubblebine. Stack and queue integrity on hostile platforms. In Proceeding of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1998.

....cate revocation. Goodrich and Tamassia showed that skip lists provide small, simple VOs for authenticated dictionaries in [12] and Anagnostopoulos et al. describe persistent authenticated dictionaries in [1] Devanbu and Stubblebine showed how to create authenticated versions of stacks and queues [10]. Recently, Goodrich et al. 13] show that a broad class of geometric data structures t our general model and thus have ecient authenticated versions. This provides further evidence that this general result will be useful for data structures beyond those we describe in this paper. In [9] we ....

P. Devanbu and S. Stubblebine. Stack and queue integrity on hostile platforms. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 26(2):100-108, 2000.

.... Schwerin showed that skip lists provide compact and simple veri cation for these settings [GTS01] and extended this work, along with Anagnostopoulos, to persistent authenticated dictionaries in [AGT01] Devanbu and Stubblebine showed how to create authenticated versions of stacks and queues in [DS00] and Maniatis and Baker [MB02b, MB02a] present similar methods for authenticating B trees and using them for secure data repositories. In [DGMS00] we introduced the general idea of authentic data publication, and showed how to securely answer a broader range of queries. This work is extended to ....

P. Devanbu and S. Stubblebine. Stack and queue integrity on hostile platforms. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 26(2), 2000.

....original work by Merkle [13] and re nements by Naor and Nissim [14] for certi cate revocation. Recently, Goodrich and Tomassia showed that skip lists provide compact and simple VOs for these settings [4, 5] Devanbu and Stubblebine showed how to create authenticated versions of stacks and queues [7]. In [8] we introduced the general idea of authentic data publication, and we showed how to securely answer range queries. This work was extended to authentic publication of XML documents in [9] using authenticated tries. The papers above (like this one) share a common theme of leveraging the ....

P. Devanbu, S. Stubblebine. Stack and Queue Integrity on Hostile Platforms, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 26(2), 2000.

....on the original work by Merkle [12] and re nements by Naor Nissim [13] for certi cate revocation. Recently, GoodrichandTomassia showed that skip lists provide compact and simple ##s for these settings [3, 4] Devanbu and Stubblebine showed howtocreate authenticated versions of stacks and queues [6]. In [7] we introduced the general idea of authentic data publication, and we showed how to securely answer range queries. This work was extended to authentic publication of XML documents in [8] using authenticated tries. These schemes (like this paper) share a common theme of leveraging the ....

P. Devanbu, S. Stubblebine. Stack and Queue Integrity on Hostile Platforms, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 26(2), 2000.

....use of secure data structures. In this scenario, a processor o# loads storage of data onto an untrusted co processor. In this context, it is necessary to verify that the data returned by the co processor is correct. Approaches have been reported for o# loading RAMs [11] secure stacks and queues [28], and other linked data structures [6] At a higher level, one would like application servers that provide a useful service to generate proof carrying answers that come with a proof of correctness. One example of this is Necula Lee s certifying compiler [65] Given a source program, the ....

P. Devanbu and S. G. Stubblebine. Stack and Queue Integrity on Hostile Platforms. In Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, May 1998.

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DEVANBU,PREKMKUMAR T. , & STUBBLEBINE,STUART G. 1998. Stack and Queue Integrity on Hostile Platforms. In: (Oak, 1998).

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