D. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....a protocol for self enforcing cooperation in general auctions and economic mechanisms, when the agents types (e.g. valuations for goods) are taken from a nite set. 2. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND The strategic interaction among self interested agents is a primary topic of study in microeconomics [4] and game theory [1] In particular, the design of protocols for strategic interactions is the subject of the eld termed mechanism design [1] The role of a mechanism (in particular, auction) designer is to de ne a game whose equilibrium strategies are desirable in some respect or another. Thus, ....

....principles and ideas grew up from the mechanism design literature, and have been adapted to the AI context. Although the study of deals among agents has received much attention in the AI literature (see e.g. 7] and although the study and design of contracts is central to information economics [4] (and received much attention in the recent AI literature [8] the literature on cooperation under incomplete information in auctions and trades is quite limited. In particular, the literature on collusion in auctions is somewhat spotty. It is still too broad to give a complete overview of it, ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

D. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

....individual participant. As a result, our study complements previous work on social laws (e.g. Moses and Tennenholtz, 1995; Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1995 ] and on the imposition of protocols on multi agent systems (e.g. Minsky, 1991a; 1991b ] as well as work in information economics (see [ Kreps, 1990 ] for a general discussion) Our work also complements work in Distributed AI dealing with rules on interactions for self motivated agents (e.g. Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994; Kraus, 1997 ] as well as work bridging the gap between Game Theory and Computer Science [ Boutilier et al. 1997; ....

D. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

....a transaction is being conducted. Failure to follow through on commitments. Discouragement of counterspeculation. Opportunities for counterspeculation arise when the rules of negotiation allow agents to gain advantage by making use of factors other than their own capabilities and valuations [20]. We are concerned with two general types of counterspeculation. Value based counterspeculation [28, 37, 36] occurs when agents use their own estimates of each other s valuations to set bid prices. In [8] we identified two classes of timebased counterspeculation opportunities. One of these ....

D. M. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

....of Internet trades by individual users, lead to new kind of settings for which new theories should be developed and evaluated. The Internet is a distributed environment where self interested parties may interact. The strategic interaction among agents is a major topic of study in microeconomics [8] and game theory [5] In particular, the design of protocols for strategic interactions is the subject of the field termed mechanism design [5, 16, 8] Research on strategic aspects of multi agent activity in Artificial Intelligence has grown rapidly in the recent years. Work in AI has mostly ....

....is a distributed environment where self interested parties may interact. The strategic interaction among agents is a major topic of study in microeconomics [8] and game theory [5] In particular, the design of protocols for strategic interactions is the subject of the field termed mechanism design [5, 16, 8]. Research on strategic aspects of multi agent activity in Artificial Intelligence has grown rapidly in the recent years. Work in AI has mostly concentrated on the design of protocols for agents interaction. Hence, work in AI shares much in common with work on mechanism design in Economics (see ....

D. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

.... it is interesting to note that MOP was inspired by general equilibrium theory where the agents strategic behavior is secondary, while our work is inspired by the game theoretic approach where the agents incentives for information revealing play a major role (the reader may wish to consult [1] for a discussion of these two basic complementary perspectives) We see this work as initiating a new line of research. Throughout the development we have made several assumptions in order to derive concrete results. These assumptions can be modified or relaxed, which will call for new analyses. ....

D. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

....individual participant. As a result, our study complements previous work on social laws (e.g. Moses and Tennenholtz, 1995; Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1995 ] and on the imposition of protocols on multi agent systems (e.g. Minsky, 1991a; 1991b ] as well as work in information economics (see [ Kreps, 1990 ] for a general discussion) Our work also complements work in Distributed AI dealing with rules on interactions for self motivated agents (e.g. Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994; Kraus, 1997 ] as well as work bridging the gap between Game Theory and Computer Science [ Boutilier et al. 1997; ....

D. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

....rst price auction, see for instance McAfee and McMillan [9] The outcome of auctions in market games with externalities has also been studied by e. g Funk [4] and Jehiel and Moldovanu [6] In section 2 we rst discuss shortly the concept of a consistent competitive equilibrium, see Kreps [7], which allows participants to make their demands conditional on the (standing) allocation and the price rather than just the price as is the case in the usual concept of competitive equilibrium. As a result we have that a consistent competitive equilibrium is envy free: no participant want to ....

....imposes a large negative externality on him, so that p is below his willingness to pay iw . We therefore consider the concept of consistent competitive equilibrium which allows players to found their demands also on the standing proposal (p; w) rather than just the price p, see for instance Kreps [7]. Given a proposal (p; w) announcing price p and winner w, player i 6= w is willing to buy the object if the price p is less than his willingness to pay iw in case the announced winner w obtains the object, and the standing winner w wants indeed to consume the object if the price p is less his ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

D. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1990. 21

....designer has to make sure that each agent is incented to behave in the desired way. This can be achieved by analyzing the game using the Nash equilibrium solution concept from game theory (or its refinements) no agent is motivated to deviate from its strategy given that the others do not deviate (Kreps 1990). However, the equilibrium for rational agents does not generally remain an equilibrium for computationally Copyright c fl 2000, American Association for Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org) All rights reserved. limited agents. 1 This leaves a potentially hazardous gap in game theory as ....

....prescribes optimal actions from that point on, given the other agent s strategy and the agent s beliefs about what has happened so far in the game. We also require that the agent s beliefs are consistent with the strategies. This type of equilibrium is called a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) (Kreps 1990). An agent s offer accept vector is affected by the solutions that it computes and also what it believes the other agent has computed for solutions. The fallback value of an agent is the value it obtained for the solution to its own problem. An agent will not accept any offer less than its ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Kreps, D. M. 1990. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press.

....buys information from the n vendors that own the values of x 1 ; x n . What is a natural set of market prices arising from this process There are, of course, many possible answers to this question just as there are many models for the behavior of prices in a competitive market [11]. Intuitively, one would believe that each vendor would try to charge a high price for its input, but not so high as to price itself out of competition. If we further believe that the individuals performing the queries will be using only optimal on line algorithms, then the vendor of x i will not ....

D. Kreps, A Course in Micro-Economic Theory, Princeton University Press, 1990.

....we expect self averagingz of normal macroscopic observables, although non self averaging might be envisaged at a more sophisticated level [4, 3] It is also appropriate to contrast our study with those of conventional economics theory. A typical assumption used in neoclassical economic theory [5] especially game theory [6] is that agents are hyper rational. They know the utility functions of other agents, they are fully aware of the process they are embedded in, they make optimum long run plans, and so forth. This is a rather extravagant and implausible model of human behaviour, ....

....aware of the process they are embedded in, they make optimum long run plans, and so forth. This is a rather extravagant and implausible model of human behaviour, especially in situations like a stock market. Moreover in neoclassical economic theory microscopic equilibrium is the reigning paradigm [5]. Individual strategies are assumed to be optimal given expectations, and expectations are assumed to be justified given the evidence. Equilibrium is thus reached in one step dynamics once hyper rationality is assumed. In this paper we consider a different, perhaps more realistic, scenario in ....

See, e.g., D.M. Kreps 1990 A Course in Microeconomics Theory (Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York). Correlation of agents in a simple market: a statistical physics perspective 14

....selection with weights Consider the following simple example. Let s assume three alternatives with u 0 = 0.1, u 1 = 0.3, u 2 = 0.6, and v 0 = 0.51, v 1 = 0.49, v 2 = 0. The first agent thus ranks the alternatives with [3, 2, 1] and the second one [1, 2, 3] The sum of the ranks, which is [4, 4, 4], leads to a random selection. Thus, both agents can only expect to get 1 3 . Assume now the second agent knows the preferences of its opponent and is thus aware of potential conflicts. Lying its ranks to [2, 1, 3] leads to sums [5, 3, 4] and as a result the second alternative is now the one ....

....the second one [1, 2, 3] The sum of the ranks, which is [4, 4, 4] leads to a random selection. Thus, both agents can only expect to get 1 3 . Assume now the second agent knows the preferences of its opponent and is thus aware of potential conflicts. Lying its ranks to [2, 1, 3] leads to sums [5, 3, 4]; and as a result the second alternative is now the one selected. Thus the second agent has been able to improve its gain to 0.49 while depressing its opponent s to 0.3. For agents with strong preferences and conflicting interest profiles (e 1) the net e#ciency of the preference selection goes ....

D. M. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

....a protocol for self enforcing cooperation in general auctions and economic mechanisms, when the agents types (e.g. valuations for goods) are taken from a finite set. 2. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND The strategic interaction among self interested agents is a primary topic of study in microeconomics [4] and game theory [1] In particular, the design of protocols for strategic interactions is the subject of the field termed mechanism design [1] The role of a mechanism (in particular, auction) designer is to define a game whose equilibrium strategies are desirable in some respect or another. ....

....principles and ideas grew up from the mechanism design literature, and have been adapted to the AI context. Although the study of deals among agents has received much attention in the AI literature (see e.g. 7] and although the study and design of contracts is central to information economics [4] (and received much attention in the recent AI literature [8] the literature on cooperation under incomplete information in auctions and trades is quite limited. In particular, the literature on collusion in auctions is somewhat spotty. It is still too broad to give a complete overview of it, ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

D. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

....framing by question wording. The inclusion or exclusion of items from the set of alternatives can produce a second form of framing. In the rational choice literature, individual preferences are often assumed to satisy independence of irrelevant alternatives #Luce and Suppes 1965; Sen 1970; Kreps 1992#. Independence of irrelevant alternatives maintains that an individual s preference relation between two alternatives should be una#ected by other elements in the set of alternatives. There may be cases where the assumption is violated. To illustrate, suppose a voter in the 1992 American ....

Kreps, David. 1992. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

....is strictly better than being candid. 29 Given that a neutral witness is misleading for high precision signals, the next natural question to ask is: under what conditions is her testimony under a perjury rule at least honest Here we have the following straightforward result. 29 See, e.g. Kreps (1990), pp. 418 421, for a discussion of the pro and cons of the concept of weak dominance. 20 Proposition 6: If max[ l a B l b A f f f or min[ l a B l b A f f f , the neutral witness testimony is honest. From Proposition 5 we know that the witness always reports a low precision ....

KREPS, D.: A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990.

....maps a resource amount to a satisfaction value. Using this function, one can compare the satisfaction levels of different resource amounts. The maximization process determines the optimal resource allocation such that utility is maximized subject to budget and resource availability constraints [10]. The maximization process requires knowledge of the individual utility curves and constraints. Since the computation required for the maximization process increases as the number of users increases, these methods are not scalable to networks with a large number of users. To provide scalability, ....

D. M. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

....terms are monadic value (Burks, 1977, p. 277) absence of attraction effect (Huber, Payne, Puto, 1982) #principle of individuation by justifiers (Broome, 1991) # and context independence (Tversky Simonson, 1993; see also Tversky, 1969) The condition is a special case of framing invariance (Kreps, 1990, p. 28) and underlies revealed preference axioms such as independence of irrelevant alternatives (Nash, 1950; Arrow, 1959) and other conditions (Samuelson, 1938; Ville, 1946; Houthakker, 1950; Sen, 1971; Tian, 1993) Classical examples have been advanced in which menu independence is not ....

.... axioms such as independence of irrelevant alternatives (Nash, 1950; Arrow, 1959) and other conditions (Samuelson, 1938; Ville, 1946; Houthakker, 1950; Sen, 1971; Tian, 1993) Classical examples have been advanced in which menu independence is not reasonable (Luce Raiffa, 1957, Section 13.3; Kreps, 1990, p. 28; Sen, 1997) In such cases, however, there is no clear meaning for preference (or nonexpected utility functionals) and standard optimization is not possible. Hence, we follow the traditions of normative analyses and assume menu independence. EXAMPLE 4.2 [Resolute Updating] Consider node ....

Kreps, D.M. (1990), "A Course in Microeconomic Theory." Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

....unintuitively, it turns out that the mere existence of a decommitment possibility in a contract can increase each agent s expected payoff. To discuss these issues more specifically, some concepts from microeconomics are introduced. First, social welfare measures the sum of the agents payoffs [7, 4]. It is a measure of how good the payoffs are to the society of agents: it does not measure distribution aspects. Pareto efficiency measures both the societal goodness of a solution and distribution aspects [7, 4] A vector of payoffs to the agents Pareto dominates another vector if each agent s ....

....are introduced. First, social welfare measures the sum of the agents payoffs [7, 4] It is a measure of how good the payoffs are to the society of agents: it does not measure distribution aspects. Pareto efficiency measures both the societal goodness of a solution and distribution aspects [7, 4]. A vector of payoffs to the agents Pareto dominates another vector if each agent s payoff in the first vector is no less than in the second, and there exists an agent whose payoff in the first vector is greater than in the second. Social welfare and Pareto efficiency can be measured either ex ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

D. M. Kreps. A course in microeconomic theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

....to x t and W t , and one finds immediately that it is optimal to stick to the candidate solution strategy, x t = x , W t = W . Therefore, by the one step deviation principle, x ; W ) is also a solution of the dynamic program, and all properties summarized in Proposition 4 confirm. 21 See Kreps, D. 1990] A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 802 ff. or Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole [1991] Game Theory, MIT Press, p. 108 110. filename: mono p.tex 14 Finally, notice that the incremental surplus mechanism is pretty good, but it may not be optimal, not even in an ....

Kreps, D. (1990). A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press.

....when safe exchange was possible, i.e. when each agent is motivated to cooperate at any point in the exchange given that the opponent will cooperate throughout the exchange. So in game theoretic terms, the cooperation of both agents throughout the exchange is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium [6]. 3 Non isolated exchange So far we have considered one exchange in isolation. Often, an agent interacts with other agents more than just once in its lifetime. One interaction may affect the agent s future interactions. For example, if an agent defects in the current exchange, its counterpart ....

Kreps, D. 1990. A course in microeconomic theory. Princeton University Press. 17

....buys information from the n vendors that own the values of x 1 , x n . What is a natural set of market prices arising from this process There are, of course, many possible answers to this question just as there are many models for the behavior of prices in a competitive market [10]. Intuitively, one would believe that each vendor would try to charge a high price for its input, but not so high as to price itself out of competition. If we further believe that the individuals performing the queries will be using only optimal on line algorithms, then the vendor of x i will not ....

D. Kreps, A Course in Micro-Economic Theory, Princeton University Press, 1990.

.... by both players will be Nash equilibrium policies, and it does not address the equilibrium coordination problem, i.e. if there are multiple Nash equilibria, how do the agents decide which equilibrium to choose This may be a serious problem, since according to the folk theorem of iterated games (Kreps, 1990), there can be a proliferation of Nash equilibria when there is sufficiently high emphasis on future rewards, i.e. a large value of the discount parameter fl. Furthermore, there may be inconsistencies between the assumed Nash policies, and the policies implied by the Q functions calculated by the ....

D. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1990.

.... S a of the contractor and S b of the contractee are in Nash equilibrium if S a is a best expected payoff maximizing response to S b , and S b is a best response to S a [ 9; 7; 5 ] Finally, a strategy is a dominant strategy if it is a best response to any strategy of the other agent [ 7 ] . We analyze contracting situations from the perspective of two agents: the contractor who pays to get a task done, and the contractee who gets paid for handling the task. Handling a task can mean taking on any types of constraints. The method is not specific to classical task allocation. The ....

D. Kreps. A course in microeconomic theory. Princeton U Press, 1990.

....designer has to make sure that each agent is incented to behave in the desired way. This can be achieved by analyzing the game using the Nash equilibrium solution concept from game theory (or its refinements) no agent is motivated to deviate from its strategy given that the others do not deviate (Kreps 1990). However, the equilibrium for rational agents does not generally remain an equilibrium for computationally limited agents. 1 This leaves a potentially hazardous gap in game Copyright c # 2000, American Association for Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org) All rights reserved. 1 In the ....

....prescribes optimal actions from that point on, given the other agent s strategy and the agent s beliefs about what has happened so far in the game. We also require that the agent s beliefs are consistent with the strategies. This type of equilibrium is called a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) (Kreps 1990). An agent s offer accept vector is affected by the solutions that it computes and also what it believes the other agent has computed for solutions. The fallback value of an agent is the value it obtained for the solution to its own problem. An agent will not accept any offer less than its ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Kreps, D. M. 1990. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press.

....a protocol for self enforcing cooperation in general auctions and economic mechanisms, when the agents types (e.g. valuations for goods) are taken from a nite set. 2 Technical background The strategic interaction among self interested agents is the primary topic of study in microeconomics [4] and game theory [1] In particular, the design of protocols for strategic interactions is the subject of the eld termed mechanism design [1] The role of a mechanism (in particular, auction) designer is to de ne a game whose equilibria strategies are desirable in some respect or another. Thus, ....

....principles and ideas grew up from the mechanism design literature, and have been adapted to the AI context. Although the study of deals among agents has received much attention in the AI literature (see e.g. 6] and although the study and design of contracts is central to information economics [4] (and received much attention in the recent AI literature [7] the literature on cooperation under incomplete information in auctions and trades is quite restricted. In particular, the literature on collusion in auctions is somewhat spotty. It is still too broad to give a complete overview of it, ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

D. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

....buys information from the n vendors that own the values of x1 ; xn . What is a natural set of market prices arising from this process There are, of course, many possible answers to this question just as there are many models for the behavior of prices in a competitive market [10]. Intuitively, one would believe that each vendor would try to charge a high price for its input, but not so high as to price itself out of competition. If we further believe that the individuals performing the queries will be using only optimal on line algorithms, then the vendor of x i will not ....

D. Kreps, A Course in Micro-Economic Theory, Princeton University Press, 1990.

....designer has to make sure that each agent is incented to behavein the desired way. This can be achieved by analyzing the game using the Nash equilibrium solution concept from game theory #or its re#nements#: no agent is motivated to deviate from its strategy given that the others do not deviate #Kreps 1990#. However, the equilibrium for rational agents does not generally remain an equilibrium for computationally Copyright c # 2000, American Association for Arti#cial Intelligence #www.aaai.org#. All rights reserved. limited agents. 1 This leaves a potentially hazardous gap in game theory as well ....

....prescribes optimal actions from that point on, given the other agent s strategy and the agent s beliefs about what has happened so far in the game. We also require that the agent s beliefs are consistent with the strategies. This type of equilibrium is called a perfect Bayesian equilibrium #PBE# #Kreps 1990#. An agent s o#er accept vector is a#ected by the solutions that it computes and also what it believes the other agent has computed for solutions. The fallback value of an agent is the value it obtained for the solution to its own problem. An agent will not accept any o#er less than its ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Kreps, D. M. 1990.A Course in Microeconomic Theory.

....such cases, the agent whose information is biased is likely to take the associated loss while the agent with unbiased information is not. 3 Implications of bounded rationality Interactions of self interested agents have been widely studied in game theory and other fields of microeconomics (e.g. [5, 20, 8]) and lately also within DAI (e.g. 9, 2] Most of the results assume perfect rationality of the agents: flawless deduction, optimal reasoning about future contingencies and recursive modeling of other agents. In terms of negotiation, perfect rationality implies that agents can compute their ....

D. M. Kreps. A course in microeconomic theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

....the class BRCFG. Yet if the agents had different PPs or computation unit costs, the problem would not necessarily be within BRCFG. In non CFGs, superadditivity, subadditivity, and the core are undefined, Fig. 2. Thus, other solution concepts are necessary. One alternative is the Nash equilibrium [17, 14], which guarantees stability in the sense that no agent alone is motivated to deviate from the solution given that others in the game do not deviate. Often this solution concept is too weak because subgroups of agents can deviate in a coordinated manner. The Strong Nash equilibrium [1] is a ....

D. M. Kreps. A course in microeconomic theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

.... of counterspeculation Opportunities for counterspeculation arise when the rules of negotiation allow agents to gain advantage by making use of factors other than their own capabilities and valuations, such as their estimates of the capabilities and valuations of the customers or other suppliers [8]. We are concerned with two general types of counterspeculation. Value based counterspeculation [12, 15, 20] occurs when agents use their own estimates of each other s valuations to set bid prices. In [1] we identified two classes of time based counterspeculation opportunities in a contracting ....

D. M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press, 1990.

....using a specific strategy no matter what strategies the other agents use. However, often an agent s best strategy depends on what strategies other agents choose. In such settings, dominant strategies do not exist, and other stability criteria are needed. The most basic one is the Nash equilibrium [46, 37, 15, 33]. The strategy profile S A = hS 1 ; S 2 ; S jAj i among agents A is in Nash equilibrium if for each agent i, S i is the agent s best strategy i.e. best response given that the other agents choose strategies hS 1 ; S 2 ; S i Gamma1 ; S i 1 ; S jAj i. In other words, in ....

....hS 1 ; S 2 ; S i Gamma1 ; S i 1 ; S jAj i. In other words, in Nash equilibrium, each agent chooses a strategy that is a best response to the other agents strategies. There are two main problems in applying Nash equilibrium. First, in some games no Nash equilibrium exists [37, 15, 33]. Second, some games have multiple Nash equilibria, and it is not obvious which one the agents should actually play [33] There are also limitations regarding what the Nash equilibrium guarantees even when it exists and is unique. First, in sequential games it only guarantees stability in the ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

David M Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

No context found.

D. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

No context found.

D. M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990.

No context found.

. D.M Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990.

No context found.

D. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

No context found.

D.M. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

No context found.

Kreps, D.M., (1990), A course in Microeconomic Theory, Princenton University Press.

No context found.

D.M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton Univ. Press, 1990.

No context found.

D. Kreps, A Course in Micro-Economic Theory, Princeton University Press, 1990.

No context found.

Kreps, D. 1990. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ.

No context found.

D. M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990.

No context found.

Kreps, D. M. (1990): A course in microeconomic theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York.

No context found.

D. M. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.

No context found.

Kreps, D. M. (1990). A course in microeconomic theory, Princeton University Press

No context found.

Kreps, David M., (1990), "A Course in Microeconomic Theory," Princton University Press, Prince- ton, NJ.

No context found.

Kreps, David. 1992. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

No context found.

Kreps, D., 1990, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

No context found.

Kreps, D. (1990), A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

No context found.

Kreps, D. 1990. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

No context found.

D. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1990.

No context found.

Kreps D. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. { Harvester Wheatsheaf. { 1990.

First 50 documents  Next 50

Online articles have much greater impact   More about CiteSeer.IST   Add search form to your site   Submit documents   Feedback  

CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC