Leslie, A.M. 1995. A theory of Agency. In D. Sperber, D. Premack, & A.J. Premack (Eds.), Causal cognition: A multidisciplinary debate. Oxford: Clarendon. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Seeing Things as People: Anthropomorphism and Common-Sense.. - Watt (1998) (1 citation) (Correct)
....anne (inside marble where) These Models of common sense psychology 187 kinds of nested queries and problems require several levels of coupling and decoupling, which are not clearly accounted for in the apparently modular descriptions favoured by Leslie. Nevertheless, even in theories such as Leslie s (1995) and in Baron Cohen et al. s (1985) false belief test, intentional and physical reasoning are both required and must be properly linked. The use of nested stances in this model will let this happen, but the approach needs a lot more investigation; it may well be that far more subtle and complex ....
....in the false belief test. Once again, I should stress that this model is intended to be descriptive rather than an accurate model of the actual processes that are involved. At this point, we have a model for a complete, though rather simple, notional world theory of mind, corresponding roughly to Leslie s (1995) theory of mind mechanism described in the previous chapter. This has been selected as much for its clarity as for its empirical correctness I ll present more empirically correct variations on the model later in the chapter, and compare them with this first version. In general, these will all ....
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Leslie, A. M. (1995). A Theory of Agency. In D. Sperber, D. Premack, & A. J. Premack (Eds.), Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate (pp. 121-141). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Seeing Things as People: Anthropomorphism and Common-Sense.. - Watt (1997) (Correct)
....prediction like (believes sally (believes anne (inside marble where) These kinds of nested queries and problems require several levels of coupling and decoupling, which are not clearly accounted for in the apparently modular descriptions favoured by Leslie. Nevertheless, even theories such as Leslie s (1995) and even in Baron Cohen et al. s (1985) false belief test, intentional and physical reasoning are both 178 Chapter 9 required and must be properly linked. The use of nested stances in this model will let this happen, but I suspect that the approach in the model is psychologically implausible, ....
....in the false belief test. Once again, I stress that this model is intended to be descriptive rather than an accurate model of the actual processes that are involved. At this point, we have a model for a complete, though rather simple, notional world theory of mind, corresponding roughly to Leslie s (1995) theory of mind mechanism described in the previous chapter. This has been selected as much for its clarity as for its empirical correctness I ll present more empirically correct variations on the model later in the chapter, and compare them with this first version. In general, these will all ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Leslie, A. M. (1995). A Theory of Agency. In D. Sperber, D. Premack, & A. J. Premack (Eds.), Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate (pp. 121-141). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cognitive Psychology 37, 156--200 (1998) - Article No Cg (1998) (Correct)
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Leslie, A.M. 1995. A theory of Agency. In D. Sperber, D. Premack, & A.J. Premack (Eds.), Causal cognition: A multidisciplinary debate. Oxford: Clarendon.
Unknown - Infants As Young (1998) (Correct)
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Leslie, A.M. (1995). A theory of Agency. In D. Sperber, D. Premack, & A.J. Premack (Eds.), Causal cognition: A multidisciplinary debate. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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