T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, F. Tohme, Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees, Artificial Intelligence 111 (1--2) (1999) 209--238. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Coalition Formation for Task Allocation via Genetic.. - Ahmadi, Sayyadian, Rabiee (2002) (Correct)
....there are many tasks that can be accomplished much more optimally by a group of agents [5] Coalition formation is one of the most widely used methods of cooperation in multi agent systems. However, a number of researchers have proposed di erent algorithms to solve the coalition formation problem [6,7,8,9]. Some of these algorithms guarantee the worst case situation [7] and some do not[6] But all of these algorithms su er from computational complexity. Speci cally, when the number of agents increase the run time of these algorithms increases drastically. Task allocation is one of the challenging ....
....group of agents [5] Coalition formation is one of the most widely used methods of cooperation in multi agent systems. However, a number of researchers have proposed di erent algorithms to solve the coalition formation problem [6,7,8,9] Some of these algorithms guarantee the worst case situation [7] and some do not[6] But all of these algorithms su er from computational complexity. Speci cally, when the number of agents increase the run time of these algorithms increases drastically. Task allocation is one of the challenging problems in multi agent systems. Di erent algorithms have been ....
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Sandholm, T., Larson, K., Andersson, M., Shehory, O., and Tohm, F. 1999. Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. Arti cial Intelligence, 111(12) , 209-238.
Coalition Formation for Task Allocation via Genetic.. - Ahmadi, Sayyadian, Rabiee (2002) (Correct)
....problem is to nd the coalition formation with the maximum value, but the search space is huge. If we consider n as the number of agents and m for number of tasks, the number of coalitions becomes 2 1. But the number of coalition structures is even more. The number of coalition structures is [1]: a i=1 Z(a; i) where Z(a; i) is the number of coalition structures with i coalitions. Z(a; i) is the Stirling number of the second kind. It is computed by the equation: Z(a; i) iZ(a 1; i) Z(a 1; i 1) When considering that tasks should be allocated to these coalitions the number of ....
Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando tohme., Coalition Structure generation with worst case garantees, Arti cial Intelligence, pp. 209-238 1999.
A Stable and Efficient Buyer Coalition Formation Scheme for.. - Yamamoto, Sycara (2001) (2 citations) (Correct)
....means to declare and match their preferences or to calculate the division of the surplus in a stable manner. This may prevent buyers from forming a large coalition. Concepts of coalition formation and its stability have been investigated in game theory [4, 5] Some research on multi agent systems [7, 8, 10, 9] has applied the concepts from game theory to multi agent cooperation, and developed algorithms to form stable and beneficial agent coalitions. Some of those algorithms are theoretically applicable to buyer coalition formation, but they cannot be used in practice. Because of their computational ....
....rely on the assumption that the maximum size of subsets in SubCol is bounded by a relatively small number k. In the context of group buying, bounding the coalition size by a small number is impractical. Research on multi agent systems also has investigated coalition formation of agents. [7] proved that, for a given set B, searching the best coalition configuration among ffBgg [ ffB1 ; B2g j B1 [B2 = B;B1 B2 = g guarantees that the largest coalition value found is within a bound from optimal one by jBj, and that no other search algorithm can establish any bound while searching ....
T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(1-2):209--238, 1999.
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core - Vincent Conitzer And (2002) (3 citations) Self-citation (Sandholm) (Correct)
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Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, and Fernando Tohm e. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(1--2):209--238, 1999. Early version appeared at the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 46--53, 1998.
Complexity of Constructing Solutions in the Core Based on.. - Conitzer, Sandholm (2006) Self-citation (Sandholm) (Correct)
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Sandholm, T., Larson, K., Andersson, M., Shehory, O., Tohm e, F., 1999. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artificial Intelligence 111 (1--2), 209--238, early version: AAAI 1998, 46--53.
Coalition Formation with Uncertain Heterogeneous Information - Kraus, Shehory (2003) (1 citation) Self-citation (Shehory) (Correct)
....formation mechanism to not only allow agents form coalitions for joint task execution, but also arrive at a coalition configuration which is optimal (in terms of utility maximization) stable, and fair. However, the computational complexity required for such solutions is exponential (see [8]) Therefore, a practical solution to be used among business parties must give up some of these ideal properties. In the business arena, although the ultimate goal of businesses is to increase their gains, optimization of these gains is usually compromised, and stability is commonly a goal ....
....and that agents take the coalition formation time into consideration when deciding on whether to join a coalition. In [9] the value of a coalition depends on the computation time. However, we consider cases in which the time for computing the coalition values is polynomial. Sandholm et al. [8] offer an algorithm that gives a tight bound of an optimal coalition structure, but in their work they take into account only one value for each coalition; in our case, a coalition may have different values for each task it may perform. All the works we mentioned assume complete ....
Sandholm, T., Larson, K., Andersson, M., Shehory, O. and Tohme F. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees, Artificial Intelligence Journal, 111(1-2) (1999), 209-238.
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core - Conitzer, Sandholm (2002) (3 citations) Self-citation (Sandholm) (Correct)
....utility, where we specify the values of some coalitions. When superadditivity holds, it is always best for the grand coalition of all agents to form. On the other hand, without superadditivity, even finding the optimal coalition structure (partition of agents into coalitions) can be hard [Sandholm et al. 1999; Larson and Sandholm, 2000; Shehory and Kraus, 1998; 1996; Ketchpel, 1994] If the representation of the game specifies V (B) or v(B) explicitly for each coalition B A, then the length of the representation is exponential in the number of agents. In that case, any algorithm for evaluating ....
Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, and Fernando Tohm e. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(1--2):209--238, 1999. Early version appeared at the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 46--53, 1998.
Role of acquaintance models in agent's private and.. - Pechoucek, Marik, Barta (2006) (Correct)
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T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, F. Tohme, Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees, Artificial Intelligence 111 (1--2) (1999) 209--238.
A Distributed Algorithm For Coalition - Formation Among Commerce (2001) (Correct)
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T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 1999.
Coalition Formation among Strong Autonomous and Weak.. - Guillaume Vauvert And (2001) (1 citation) (Correct)
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T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 1999.
Agent Based Production Planning - Pechoucek (Correct)
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Sandholm, T., Larson, K., Andersson, M., Shehory, O., and Tohme, F. (1999). Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(12) , 209-238.
Role of Subscription based Contraction in Agent based.. - Michal Pechoucek.. (2003) (Correct)
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Sandholm, T., Larson, K., Andersson, M., Shehory, O., and Tohme, F. (1999). Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(12) , 209-238.
Generating Coalition Structures with Finite Bound from the.. - Dang, Jennings (2004) (Correct)
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T.Sandholm,K.Larson,M.Andersson,O.Shehory,and F. Tohme. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(1-2):209-- 238, 1999.
Groups as Agents with Mental Attitudes - Guido Boella Dipartimento (2004) (Correct)
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T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantee. Artificial Intelligence, 111 (1-2):209--238, 1999.
Organization-Based Coalition Formation - Sherief Abdallah Victor (2004) (1 citation) (Correct)
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T. Sandholm and et al. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantee. Proceedings of the 3rd Internation Conference on Autonomous Agents, 1999.
Reactive, Distributed Layered Architecture for.. - Low, Leow, Ang, Jr. (2004) (Correct)
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T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme, "Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees," Artificial Intelligence, vol. 111, no. 1-2, pp. 209--238, 1999.
Bayesian Reinforcement Learning for Coalition.. - Georgios Chalkiadakis .. (2004) (Correct)
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T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme. Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(1--2):209--238, 1999.
Bayesian Reinforcement Learning for Coalition Formation.. - Chalkiadakis, Boutilier (Correct)
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T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme. Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(1--2):209--238, 1999.
Bayesian Reinforcement Learning for Coalition Formation.. - Chalkiadakis, Boutilier (Correct)
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T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme. Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(1--2):209--238, 1999.
Qualitative Coalitional Reasoning with Preferences - Dunne, Wooldridge (2004) (Correct)
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T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(1-- 2):209--238, 1999.
On the Computational Complexity of Qualitative Coalitional Games - Wooldridge, Dunne (2004) (Correct)
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T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(1--2):209--238, 1999.
Generating Coalition Structures With Finite Bound From the.. - Guarantees Viet Dung (Correct)
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T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(1-2):209-- 238, 1999.
Groups as Agents with Mental Attitudes - Boella, van der Torre (2004) (Correct)
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T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantee. Artificial Intelligence, 111 (1-2):209--238, 1999.
Preferences in Qualitative Coalitional Games - Paul Dunne And (2004) (Correct)
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T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(1--2):209--238, 1999.
On Two Families of Paradigms of Group-Solvability - Agostini (2002) (Correct)
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T. W. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohme. Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Arti cial Intelligence, 111(1-2):209-238, 1999.
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