John Haugeland, Artificial intelligence: The very idea, Bradford Books, 1989.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....knowledge. A tendency in the development of expert systems is to now include more general, theoretical knowledge, on which the system can fall back when faced with problems that cannot be solved by shallow knowledge alone. Such systems are called second generation systems[2] Haugeland(1986)[3] has formulated several requirements that a problem domain must fulfill in order to make the development of an expert system practical : Firstly, the decisions must depend on a well defined set of variables. Secondly, the values of the variables must be known. Thirdly, the exact way in which the ....

Haugeland, J. (1986). Artificial Intelligence : The very idea. Cambridge MA : the MIT Press.

....and the tools we use to design and build robots. Shell Canada Fellow, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research 1 2 A. K. Mackworth 2 Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence and Robotics The phrase Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI) was introduced by Haugeland [3] to characterize the classical symbol manipulation approach to AI. In GOFAI intelligence is identified with reasoning and reasoning with rule based manipulation of symbolic structures. Given the fact that syntactic proof theory and Tarskian semantic model theory can be placed in isomorphic ....

J. Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985.

....tape might suffice for this purpose. Rebutting this objection requires us to explain how an infinite virtual machine can be implemented in a finite physical machine. 1 Turing machines are often taken to be especially relevant to so called good old fashioned AI or GOFAI. This term coined by Haugeland (1985) is used by many people who have read only incomplete and biased accounts of the history of AI, and have no personal experience of working on the problems. 2 2 Two Strands of Development Leading to Computers Two old strands of engineering development came together in the production of computers ....

J. Haugeland. Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985.

....real human. On that basis, we can continue to look at the role of common sense psychology in the Turing test. Turning to more empirical arguments, even understanding a sonnet like Shall I compare thee to a summer s day calls for common sense psychology, let al..one writing one (Turing, 1950) As Haugeland (1985) comments on Turing s imaginary dialogue: the student has displayed not only competence with the English language, but also a passable understanding of poetry, the seasons, people s feelings, and so on . This understanding of feelings shows that the Turing test, even in its original form, does at ....

Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

....Indeed, a Turing machine can compute more than a Cray, since (a) the Cray has access to only a bounded amount of memory, and (b) the Cray s speed of operation is limited by various real world constraints. It is often said, incorrectly, that a Turing machine is necessarily slow (for example Haugeland 1985: 140) A Turing machine is an idealised device and has no real world constraints on its speed of operation. A program or machine table for a Turing machine is a finite collection of instructions each calling for certain primitive operations to be performed if certain conditions are met. Every ....

Haugeland, J. 1985. Artificial Intelligence: the Very Idea. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

....systems that think rationally, and systems that act rationally [Russell and Norvig 1995] 3 Examples of the first type include Haugeland and Bellman s definitions. Haugeland defined AI as The exiting new effort to make computers think . machines with minds, in the full and literal sense [Haugeland 1985]. Bellman stated that AI is The automation of activities that we associate with human thinking, activities such as decision making, problem solving, learning. Bellman 1978] Examples of the second type of definitions (systems that act like humans) are those of Kurzweil, and Rich and Knight s. ....

J. Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The very Idea, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 1985.

....reinforcement learning techniques, ARBIB learns from exposure to its environment via low level mechanisms of habituation, sensitisation and classical conditioning. We see ARBIB as a vehicle for studying the animat path to AI (Wilson 1991) One of the central tenets of good old fashioned AI (Haugeland 1985) was implementation independence. That is, intelligence is achieved by running some program ; the hardware on which it runs is unimportant. By contrast, this work is motivated by new ideas of embodied AI which hold that possession of a body situated in its environment is a vital part of being a ....

Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press.

....meaning of a situation, low level perceptual processes are not enough; there is a clear need for further perceptual processing. 2) GOFAI symbolic manipulation. This is the other side of the AI coin, dubbed by philosopher John Haugeland as GOFAI, for good old fashioned artificial intelligence [4], where programs usually handle (syntactically) a representation that supposedly should have been formed by a perceptual process. These systems, such as theorem proving systems, chess playing, and others, do perform some impressive feats, but they do not have a clue about the semantics of their ....

J. Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985.

....order to address computer based instruction for engineering, we have to ponder both the advantages and disadvantages of computer based learning. One major advantage is the power of simulation that comes from the universal nature of digital computation. Digital computers are in fact formal systems [6], so they can simulate any mathematical solution to a problem. Thus, a computer program is practically and theoretically as powerful a representation as an equation. This is particularly appealing in engineering and digital signal processing, which typically use a strong mathematical formulation. ....

Haugeland J., "Artificial Intelligence: the very idea", MIT Press, 1985.

....we have to ponder both the advantages and disadvantages of computer enhanced learning. The four major advantages in computer enhanced engineering instruction are: 1. The power of simulation that comes from the universal nature of digital computation. Digital computers are in fact formal systems [18], so they can simulate any mathematical solution to a problem. Thus, a computer program is practically and theoretically as powerful a representation as an equation. The formal nature of simulators is particularly appealing in engineering. Moreover, if the computer program is modular ....

Haugeland J., Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, MIT Press, 1985.

....environment. In order to address computer based instruction, we have to ponder both the advantages and disadvantages of computer based learning. One major advantage is the power of simulation that comes from the universal nature of digital computation. Digital computers are in fact formal systems [1], so they can simulate any mathematical solution to a problem. Thus, a computer program is practically and theoretically as powerful a representation as an equation. This is particularly appealing in engineering and digital signal processing, which typically require a strong mathematical ....

Haugeland J., "Artificial Intelligence: the very idea", MIT Press, 1985.

....less of a role in cognition than has traditionally been supposed (e.g. Skarda 1986; Wheeler forthcoming) The differences between the dynamical and classical approaches should not be exaggerated. The dynamical approach stands opposed to what John Haugeland has called Good Old Fashioned AI (Haugeland 1985). However, dynamical systems may well be performing computation in some other sense (e.g. analog computation or real computation; Blum, Shub, and Smale 1989; Siegelmann and Sontag 1994) Also, dynamical systems are generally effectively computable. Note that something can be computable ....

Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

....between the system and the domain, such that (a) the correspondences are systematic with respect to those digital aspects of the system in terms of which the rule governs system behavior, and (b) the system s states and behaviors make sense in the light of those correspondences. 6 5 See (Haugeland, 1985), Chapter 2. In abstract systems, discreteness of values suffices for digitality. 6 What is it to make sense This is a difficult issue; see (Haugeland, 1985) Chapter 3, for discussion. Every digital system can be set up in systematic correspondence with some domain (such as integers and ....

....the rule governs system behavior, and (b) the system s states and behaviors make sense in the light of those correspondences. 6 5 See (Haugeland, 1985) Chapter 2. In abstract systems, discreteness of values suffices for digitality. 6 What is it to make sense This is a difficult issue; see (Haugeland, 1985), Chapter 3, for discussion. Every digital system can be set up in systematic correspondence with some domain (such as integers and functions over them) but not all such systems have an interpretation in the current sense. The ones that do are those exhibiting a further kind of order that does or ....

Haugeland, J. (1985) Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

....and this appropriateness is a matter of the meaning of that previous utterance, and whatever meaning is, it is not something straightforwardly physical that has causal effects that can be built into the machine. 7 John Haugeland has described this problem as the Paradox of Mechanical Reason (Haugeland, 1985), and has argued that twentieth century philosophy and computer science have managed to come up with a certain kind of solution, one that requires that the machine be a computer i.e. a machine which manipulates symbolic structures purely on the basis of their syntax, but in doing so manages to ....

....science literature. In the last ten to fifteen years numerous book have been written on Artificial Intelligence. Most of these have been technical introductions to AI programming, written by and for computer scientists. The philosopher John Haugeland s book Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea (Haugeland, 1985), by contrast, aims at an understanding of AI in terms of its wider historical and conceptual context. He sets out by sketching the history of certain key ideas and problems, from Copernicus and Galileo through Descartes, Hobbes and Hume. He then spends two whole chapters just articulating what a ....

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Haugeland, J. (1985) Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

....human. On that basis, we can continue to look at the role of common sense psychology in the Turing test. Turning to more empirical arguments, even understanding a sonnet such as Shall I compare thee to a summer s day calls for common sense psychology, let al..one writing one (Turing, 1950) As Haugeland (1985) comments on Turing s imaginary dialogue: the student has displayed not only competence with the English language, but also a passable understanding of poetry, the seasons, people s feelings, and so on . This understanding of feelings shows that the Turing test, even in its original form, does at ....

Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

....or x = y. 7 For expressions of this consensus see, for example, Clark, 1989; Copeland, 1993; Dreyfus, 1992; Fodor, 1975; Fodor Pylyshyn, 1988; Newell, 1980; Newell Simon, 1976; Pylyshyn, 1984) The version of this consensus now most widely accepted as definitive is probably that laid out in (Haugeland, 1985). The account of digital computers here is essentially just Haugeland s definition of computers as interpreted automatic formal systems as massaged into the present framework. 6 concrete case, this means that the variable must instantiate those variables positively and reliably. 8 When all ....

....to be lifted off the shelf. Nevertheless, cognitive scientists do have a good working grasp of the issue. In the vast majority of cases they agree whether a system counts as dynamical in the sense that matters for them. The challenge here is to articulate that intuitive understanding. 8 See (Haugeland, 1985), Chapter 2. In abstract systems, discreteness of values suffices for digitality. 9 What is it to make sense This is a difficult issue; see (Haugeland, 1985) Chapter 3, for discussion. Every digital system can be set up in systematic correspondence with some domain (such as integers and ....

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Haugeland, J. (1985) Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

.... school of philosophy, and I have in fact written a related critique based on Anglo American philosophy [9] But it is important to understand that these critiques are directed only against developing AI on an information processing model what John Haugeland has called good oldfashioned AI [8]. This is the view roughly that the brain embodies a formal system, and any embodiment of it (such as a computer) would be equally intelligent. The critiques of this model do not refute the notion that a digital computer might, for instance, solve a system of differential equations that simulate ....

Haugeland, John, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, MIT Press (1985).

....table is vastly bigger than the human brain could possibly store, we can take it that there must be better ways to pass the test. 14. A less formal argument is that simply understanding a sonnet like Shall I compare thee to a summer s day calls for naive psychology, let al..one writing one. As Haugeland (1985) comments on Turing s (1950) imaginary dialogue: the student has displayed not only competence with the English language, but also a passable understanding of poetry, the seasons, people s feelings, and so on. I would argue, then, that the Turing test, even in its original form, does touch on ....

Haugeland, J. (1985) Artificial intelligence: the very idea. MIT Press.

....control of the model has been decentralized or distributed. The AndersonPort model for auditory pattern recognition that will be described below is also active in this sense. Digital vs. Analog. Do the representations enable operations upon them that are positive and reliable in the terms of (Haugeland, 1985) In classical symbol systems, representations are digital in the sense that the most basic identifying and transforming processes can always be carried out with complete, unambiguous success (e.g. the executive system can tell that the symbol in the buffer is either foo or it is not; there is no ....

Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. MIT Press.

....and is called the source domain or the base domain. The other is called the target domain, and the mapping of the analogy to the target is called analogical transfer. In modeling analogy making, the traditionalists have not been limited to GOFAI ( Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence , Haugeland, 1985) symbolic techniques. Many researchers have used more modern mechanisms, such as connectionist networks. The following section discusses those models, connectionist and symbolic, that make some, or all, of the traditional assumptions. 6.1.1 Structure Matching Engine Gentner s theories of ....

Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

....Thus cycles the dialectic between the philosophy and science of ALife. 2.2 Artificial Intelligence Artificial intelligence has profoundly affected contemporary philosophy. Much attention has been given to weighing its philosophical implications (Boden 1977 and 1990, Dennett 1978, Dreyfus 1979, Haugeland 1985, Hofstadter 1985) Although many conclusions are still controversial, there is wide agreement about which issues are important and which positions deserve serious attention. Since ALife and AI share so many important features, we can exploit the familiarity of the intellectual terrain around AI ....

....that more extensive exploration of ALife might force us to revise what we now take to be settled conclusions about AI. We noted above that traditional AI has certainly not enjoyed overwhelming and unequivocal success, because of combinatorial explosion and the frame problem (Dreyfus 1979, Haugeland 1985, Hofstadter 1985, Boden 1990) These very problems show some promise of being mitigated by the bottom up modeling strategies embodied in the new PDP models (McClelland and Rumelhart 1986) Although it is too early to judge the final success of the PDP approach, the similarity between PDP models ....

Haugeland, J. 1985. Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

.... one event can be privileged over the others as the primary determining event: the three way relationship (represented item, representation and user) needed for a representational story is missing 9 4 Statements of the computationalist thesis can be found in (Newell and Simon, 1976; Fodor, 1975; Haugeland, 1985; Pylyshyn, 1984, 1987) 5 Dynamical systems are generally represented by evolutionary (in time) partial differential equations. For an introduction, see (van Gelder and Port, 1995) 6 (Clark, 1998) 7 (Clark, 1998) pp 357 359. Arms on a vertical spindle control steam flow through a throttle ....

Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

....knowledge. A tendency in the development of expert systems is to now include more general, theoretical knowledge, on which the system can fall back when faced with problems that cannot be solved by shallow knowledge alone. Such systems are called second generation systems[2] Haugeland(1986)[3] has formulated several requirements that a problem domain must fulfill in order to make the development of an expert system practical : Firstly, the decisions must depend on a well defined set of variables. Secondly, the values of the variables must be known. Thirdly, the exact way in which the ....

Haugeland, J. (1986). Artificial Intelligence : The very idea. Cambridge MA : the MIT Press.

....be appropriate for specific classes of problem domains. This paper argues that the challenges posed for robots in complex dynamic domains have not been adequately addressed by extant architectures and describes one possible solution. Related Work The Good Old Fashioned AI and Robotics (GOFAIR) (Haugeland, 1985; Mackworth, 1993) research paradigm has shaped the area of robotics since the time of the robot Shakey (Nilsson, 1984) Some of the fundamental assumptions made of the world in the pure form of GOFAIR were that there is only one agent, that the environment is static, that actions are discrete and ....

Haugeland, J. 1985. Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea.

....a picture containing a picture of itself [3; p197] a precursor of today s fractal images. A similar example is Minsky s Society of Mind [10] which is, again, a structural model involving similarity of agents. A more behavioural example can be seen in the classification of feelings by Haugeland [6] into seven fuzzy categories, sensations, reactions or passions, emotions, interpersonal feelings, sense of merit (for other people and oneself) and moods. Haugeland also goes some way to identifying dimensions and criteria which can be used to discriminate different kinds of feeling. Sloman [11] ....

Haugeland, J. (1985) Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Bradford Books.

....it all originates from experience. The rationalists maintain that knowledge is formed through inter association of several ideas that form higher level conceptual ideas or cognitions. Philosophers such as Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant constitute the philosophical ancestors to this doctrine (Haugeland 1986). Within this epistemological doctrine, labeled cognitive learning theories, two important learning theories have developed: gestalt theory and information processing theory. These two learning theories are described below. Gestalt learning This paradigm raised protests against the narrow and ....

Haugeland, J. (1986), Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, A Bradford Book, MIT, Massachusetts.

....that can be measured on anything like the topological dimensions familiar to fractals. Further investigation seems to reveal that there is some kind of scaleability, so that there is an affinity between different aspects of behaviour viewed at different scales. Figure 6 reproduces a table from Haugeland (1985; p233) illustrating seven different kinds of feeling. Each kind of feeling has a different character, but much of this associated with differences in level, like duration. Object to which feeling pertains Subtle sense of object involved Rational support is relevant Dimension of variation ....

Haugeland, J. (1985) Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea . Bradford Books.

....limited environment containing a floor and some solid, polyhedral objects without surface texture. Such an environment would appear to be similar to that of a child learning to play with toy blocks, and would suggest the possibility of using a robot arm to manipulate real blocks. As pointed out in Haugeland (1985, p.185) a blocks world paradigm appears to have originated at MIT during the sixties. Both Roberts and Waltz (whose 1972 paper is discussed below) worked at MIT. Winograd (1972) also at MIT, constructed the SHRDLU natural language understanding system, which could conduct a simple dialogue ....

....Vision and Traditional AI Waltz (1982) gives a general overview of artificial intelligence, illustrating the fact that vision has long been one of the goals of AI. However, some writers have suggested that the traditional tools of AI may not be appropriate for all aspects of computer vision. Haugeland (1985) re examined the foundations of traditional artificial intelligence research. According to Haugeland s argument, research in artificial intelligence had been almost exclusively concerned with symbol manipulation, whereas much of the intelligent behaviour of humans could be explained only in terms ....

Haugeland, J., Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, MIT Press, 1985.

....of our argument against Strong AI, is I : 9x (Mx 8 y (My ) Dyx) 2.2 The Heart of Strong AI The view that cognition is computation needs little introduction. Propelled by the writings of innumerable thinkers [e.g. Hobbes, 1839; Barr, 1983; Fetzer, 1994; Simon, 1980, 1981; Newell, 1980; Haugeland, 1981; Hofstadter, 1985; Johnson Laird, 1988; Dietrich, 1990; Bringsjord, 1992; Searle, 1980; Harnad, 1991) and this touches but the tip of a mammoth iceberg of relevant writing] this view has reached every corner of, and indeed energizes the bulk of, contemporary AI. The view has also touched ....

....mimic intelligence or produce some clever fake. Not at all. AI wants only the genuine article: machines with minds, in the full and literal sense. This is not science fiction, but real science, based on a theoretical conception as deep as it is daring: namely, we are, at root, computers ourselves (Haugeland, 1981, p. 2) This conveys the core spirit of Strong AI, which wavers not a bit in the face of questions about whether, say, sensors and effectors are necessary. 5 Nonetheless, it will facilitate matters if we have a rather more focussed version of the doctrine on the table. Accordingly, we will ....

Haugeland, J. (1981) Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

....artifact. 1 Different sources cite 1947 and 1948 as the time of writing, but it was not published until long after his death. 3. 1 Minds The traditional approach taken in artificial intelligence to building intelligent programs has affectionately been dubbed Good Old Fashioned AI , or GOFAI (Haugeland 1985). It is epitomized in the modularity arguments of Fodor (1983) and in the physical symbol system hypothesis of Newell Simon (1981) These approaches reduce AI to the problem of constructing a brain in a box symbolic manipulator which would act intelligently if given appropriate connection to a ....

Haugeland, J. (1985), Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusets.

....familiarity with elementary logic. 2 Expertise as Computation in First Order Logic The view that cognition and, therefore, expertise is computation needs little introduction. Propelled by the writings of innumerable thinkers (e.g. Barr, 1983; Fetzer, 1994; Simon, 1980, 1981; Newell, 1980; Haugeland, 1981; Hofstadter, 1985; Johnson Laird, 1988; Dietrich, 1990; Bringsjord, 1992; Searle, 1980; Harnad, 1991) and this touches but the tip of a mammoth iceberg of relevant writing) this view (let us call it computationalism) energizes AI, cognitive science and expert systems. The view has also ....

....mimic intelligence or produce some clever fake. Not at all. AI wants only the genuine article: machines with minds, in the full and literal sense. This is not science fiction, but real science, based on a theoretical conception as deep as it is daring: namely, we are, at root, computers ourselves (Haugeland, 1981, p. 2) This conveys the core spirit of computationalism, which wavers not a bit in the face of questions about whether sensors and effectors are necessary, or where in the Chomsky Hierarchy from finite state automata to Turing Machines people fall. Nonetheless, it will facilitate matters if we ....

Haugeland, J. (1981) Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

....The notion event is completely connected to the interaction between a system and the world. This last point will be further dealt with in the discussion section. While cognitivism assumes that there is a body of knowledge to be able to explain behavior and postpones the question of learning (Haugeland, 1985) this proposal takes the opposite strategy. The central theme is how a system can acquire knowledge from its interaction with the world: how does adaptation take place and what are its prerequisites. Moreover, all processes, internal and external, are in principle dynamic. The observed behavior ....

Haugeland, J.(1985). Artificial Intelligence: The very idea. Cambridge Ma.: MIT.

.... Another way to express the difference between the interpretation of sentences and primitive symbols (such as constants and predicates) is that, whereas the meanings of sentences are systematically determined by their composition, the meanings of primitive symbols are arbitrary (cf. Haugeland [Hau85]) How then, are these assignments actually carried out This is often explained in terms of an abstract mathematical model of those entities in the world making up the semantic values of symbols in the description language. Formally, a model is an ordered pair: A; F where A is a set of ....

J. Haugeland. Artificial Intelligence -- The Very Idea. MIT Press, 1985.

....work in neuroscience. The primary benefits from this work will be in the striving, rather than in the constructed artifact. 3. 1 Minds The traditional approach taken in artificial intelligence to building intelligent programs has affectionately been dubbed Good Old Fashioned AI , or GOFAI (Haugeland 1985). It is epitomized in the modularity arguments of Fodor (1983) and in the physical symbol system hypothesis of Newell Simon (1981) These approaches reduce Al to the problem of constructing a brain in a box symbolic manipulator which would act intelligently if given appropriate connection to a ....

Haugeland, J. 1985. Artificial Intelligence --- The Very Idea, MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.

....and by doing so offer a glimpse of our forthcoming monograph on uncomputable cognition [2b] 2 The Computational Conception of Mind The view that cognition is computation needs little introduction. Propelled by the writings of innumerable thinkers (e.g. 19] 2] 16] 36] 37] 28] [18]; 20] 23] 14] 2e] 35] 17] and this touches but the tip of a mammoth iceberg of relevant writing) this view has reached every corner of, and indeed energizes the bulk of, contemporary Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Cognitive Science (Cog Sci) The view has also touched nearly ....

....mimic intelligence or produce some clever fake. Not at all. AI wants only the genuine article: machines with minds, in the full and literal sense. This is not science fiction, but real science, based on a theoretical conception as deep as it is daring: namely, we are, at root, computers ourselves ([18], p. 2) This conveys the core spirit of Strong AI, which wavers not a bit in the face of questions about whether sensors and effectors are necessary, or where in the Chomsky Hierarchy from finite state automata to Turing Machines people fall. Nonetheless, it will facilitate matters if we have ....

Haugeland, J. (1981) Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

....draft, and I profited from reading his The Conscious Mind, wherein zombies are taken to be logically possible. Conversations with Ned Block and Bill Rapaport also proved to be valuable. 1 Sometimes also called Strong Artificial Intelligence (Russell Norvig: 51] or GOFAI (Haugeland: [37]) or the computational conception of mind (Glymour: 34] etc. Dennett, the person to be is the robot cog, or a descendant thereof, a being taking shape with Dennett s help at MIT. 2 I have advanced a number of arguments designed to establish that the person building project will ....

.... for person building by first trying to establish (1 C ) and (2 C ) other than a specification of such a modal conditional: 2 C ) And that such a conditional be taken to capture the heart of computationalism is quite in keeping with the literature (e.g. 38] 3] 31] 56] 57] 42] [37], 39] 40] 21] 14] 54] 36] which takes computation to reflect the essence of thinking. The idea is that thinking is computing, not that computing can be so configured as to produce a thing that seems to think but really doesn t (as in a zombie) Here is how Haugeland puts it: What are ....

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Haugeland, J. (1981) Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

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John Haugeland, Artificial intelligence: The very idea, Bradford Books, 1989.

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J. Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985.

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Haugeland, J. (1985) Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

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John Haugeland. Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. The MIT Press, 1985.

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John Haugeland (1985). Artificial Intelligence: The very idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Haugeland, J. 1985. Artificial intelligence : the very idea. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

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J. Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence --- the very idea, A Bradford Book. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1985

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