Moni Naor, Benny Pinkas, and Reuban Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 129--139. ACM Press, 1999. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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On Unconditionally Secure Distributed Oblivious Transfer - Blundo, D'Arco, De.. (2003) (Correct)
.... can be found in the literature as well as papers addressing issues such as the relation of the OT with other cryptographic primitives, the assumptions required to implement such a concept, reductions among more complex forms of OT to simpler ones and applicative environments (e.g. [15, 11, 23, 19, 3, 21, 22, 16, 29, 36, 28], just to name few examples) Our Contribution. In this paper we study unconditionally secure distributed oblivious transfer protocols, introduced in [34] in order to strengthen the security of protocols designed for electronic auctions [36] We present an analysis and some new results: lower ....
....(e.g. 15, 11, 23, 19, 3, 21, 22, 16, 29, 36, 28] just to name few examples) Our Contribution. In this paper we study unconditionally secure distributed oblivious transfer protocols, introduced in [34] in order to strengthen the security of protocols designed for electronic auctions [36]. We present an analysis and some new results: lower bounds on the resources required by an implementation such as randomness, memory storage, and communication complexity; some impossibility results for one round protocols; two polynomial based constructions implementing 1 out of n distributed ....
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner, Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design, proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 129--139, 1999.
Cryptographic Security for Mobile Code - Algesheimer, Cachin, Camenisch.. (2003) (10 citations) (Correct)
....of the other parties and the corresponding proofs ensuring robustness become much simpler. T has to know g and h for constructing the circuit, but it may obtain a description of C from O in the first protocol message. We use a three party oblivious transfer protocol introduced by Naor et al. [NPS99] in which the role of the chooser is separated among the chooser and a third party, called the receiver. Compared to the standard notion of oblivious transfer (see Section 3.1) the receiver gets the output message m # specified by the chooser, who itself learns nothing. This so called proxy ....
.... The protocol needs also a one round implementation of standard oblivious transfer between two parties, which can be realized using the methods of Cachin et al. CCKM00] or Sander et al. SYY99] Note that the overall structure of this protocol is similar to the auction scheme of Naor et al. [NPS99]. Protocol. As in the basic scheme the essential component here is the encrypted circuit construction. The protocol is described for the basic case of mobile code with a single host H. Suppose O employs a public key encryption scheme with encryption and decryption operations denoted by EO ( and ....
M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner, Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design, Proc. 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 1999.
A Second-price Sealed-bid Auction with Verifiable Discriminant .. - Omote, Miyaji (2003) (1 citation) (Correct)
....auction. But a first price sealed bid auction cannot directly be applied to a second price sealed bid auction which keeps the highest bid secret with public verifiability. This is why we need new techniques for a second price sealed bid auction. 1. 2 Related works We discuss several studies[13, 7, 1] as a second price sealed bid auction. These schemes set the bidding points discretely. 13] realizes some kinds of sealed bid auctions using two auction managers AM1 and AM2, which applies the oblivious transfer. But this scheme requires the cut and choose technique in order to sat isfy public ....
....sealed bid auction which keeps the highest bid secret with public verifiability. This is why we need new techniques for a second price sealed bid auction. 1.2 Related works We discuss several studies[13, 7, 1] as a second price sealed bid auction. These schemes set the bidding points discretely. [13] realizes some kinds of sealed bid auctions using two auction managers AM1 and AM2, which applies the oblivious transfer. But this scheme requires the cut and choose technique in order to sat isfy public verifiability. Kikuchi [7] also proposed the (M l)st price sealed bid auction using the ....
M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. "Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design". In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 120- 127, 1999.
New Results on Unconditionally Secure Distributed.. - Blundo, D'Arco, De .. (2002) (4 citations) (Correct)
.... can be found in the literature as well as papers addressing issues such as the relation of the OT with other cryptographic primitives, the assumptions required to implement such a concept, reductions among more complex forms of OT to simpler ones and applicative environments (e.g. [13, 9, 17, 16, 3, 14, 23, 26, 22], just to name few examples) Our Contribution. In this paper we study unconditionally secure distributed oblivious transfer protocols, introduced in [25] in order to strengthen the security of protocols designed for electronic auctions [26] We present an analysis and some new results: lower ....
....environments (e.g. 13, 9, 17, 16, 3, 14, 23, 26, 22] just to name few examples) Our Contribution. In this paper we study unconditionally secure distributed oblivious transfer protocols, introduced in [25] in order to strengthen the security of protocols designed for electronic auctions [26]. We present an analysis and some new results: lower bounds on the resources required by an implementation such as randomness, memory storage, and communication complexity; some impossibility results for one round protocols; two polynomial based constructions implementing 1 out of n distributed ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner, Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design, ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 1999 available at http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/ naor/onpub.html
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In Proc. of the 1st ACM conf. on Electronic Commerce, 1999.
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In Proc. of the 1st ACM conf. on Electronic Commerce, 1999.
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Naor, M., Pinkas, B. and Sumner, R. (1999). Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design, in The 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 129-139.
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Naor, M., Pinkas, B., Sumner, R.: Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In: Proc. of the 1st conf. on Electronic Commerce, ACM (1999) 129--139
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM Press, 1999.
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner, "Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design," in The 1st Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 129--139, 1999.
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 129--139. ACM Press, 1999.
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM conf. on Electronic Commerce, 1999.
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 129--139. ACM Press, 1999.
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM conf. on Electronic Commerce, 1999.
ACM SIGACT News Distributed Computing Column 9 - Sergio Rajsbaum October (Correct)
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Moni Naor, Benny Pinkas and Reuben Sumner. Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design. In The 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, November 1999. 11
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM conf. on Electronic Commerce, 1999.
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner, Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design, ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (1999), pp. 129-139.
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In Proc. of 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 129--139. ACM Press, 1999.
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, R. Sumner, Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design, ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 1999, available at http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/ naor/onpub.html.
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design. In Proc. 1-st ACM Conf. on E. Commerce. ACM Press, New York, 1999.
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M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design. In Proceedings of EC99, pages 129--139, 1999. 25
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