A. Odlyzko. Paris metro pricing for the internet. Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 140--147, 1999. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Proc. of the 10th International Conference on Network.. - Incentive Engineering In (2002) (Correct)
....to the IA service. There lies the inherent trade off in the offered services between the two classes. There are two ways to design service models that promote self differentiation among users: differentiated pricing or service classes tailored toward specific user groups. The Paris Metro Price [16] is an example of using two tier pricing to realize differentiated services without any additional network mechanisms. In contrast, the Alternative Best Effort service proposed in [8] is a good example of designing two alternative service classes, each of which is preferred by data and multimedia ....
....for adaptation by charging sessions that benefit from the adaptation, while compensating sessions that suffer from adaptation. However, the exact calculation of credits and charges are challenging and are not formulated in [3] In [9] the authors analyze the property of the Paris Metro Pricing [16] scheme within the context of wireless access service. The service offering is limited with no support for allocation stability. The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present an overview of our framework including the allocation price service menu and messaging protocol. We ....
A. M. Odlyzko. Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet. In Proc. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'99), pages 140--147, 1999.
Dynamic Bandwidth Management for the Internet and its Wireless.. - Liao (Correct)
....and convergence problem are common to users playing extensive strategies in a repeated game setting [43] There are two ways to design service models that promote self di#erentiation among users: di#erentiated pricing or service classes tailored toward specific user groups. The Paris Metro Price [80] is an example of using two tier pricing to realize di#erentiated services without any additional network mechanisms. In contrast, the Alternative Best E#ort service proposed in [49] is a good example of designing two alternative service classes, each of which is preferred by data and multimedia ....
....for adaptation by charging sessions that benefit from the adaptation, while compensating sessions that su#er from adaptation. However, the exact calculation of credits and charges are challenging and are not formulated in [11] In [54] the authors analyze the property of the Paris Metro Pricing [80] scheme within the context of wireless access service. The service o#ering is limited with no support for allocation stability. Because price is non monetary in our scheme, we use conventional measurement based tra#c prediction and hando# admission control to assure hando# performance. There has ....
A. M. Odlyzko. Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet. In Proc. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'99), pages 140--147, 1999.
Network Resource Allocation and A Congestion Game - Johari, Tsitsiklis (2003) (6 citations) (Correct)
....to manage congestion in networks; see, e.g. 1] for an early overview of some of the issues involved, and [2] for a more recent discussion. The proposals have varied widely in approach and simplicity, including applications of auction theory [3] as well as simple fixed rate pricing mechanisms [4]. In this paper, we will consider a framework with a single network manager, who wishes to allocate network capacity efficiently among a collection of users, each endowed with a utility function depending on their allocated rate. In [5] a market is proposed where each user submits a bid, or ....
A. M. Odlyzko, "Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet," in Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC '99), 1999, pp. 140--147.
Congestion Control, Differentiated Services, and Efficient.. - O'Donnell, Sethu (2003) (Correct)
....end users. 1.1 Related Work and Motivation Over the last several years, a number of research proposals have advocated the creation of an economic market for congestion control and di#erentiated services. One of the simplest means of achieving QoS di#erentiation is through Paris Metro Pricing [20], which assigns fixed prices for tra#c from di#erent service classes and logically partitions the network into separate channels, each version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Communications, April May 2002, New York, NY, pp. 986 990. with its own ....
A. Odlyzko. Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 140--147, Denver, CO, November 1999.
Pricing Network Services - Shu, Varaiya (2003) (6 citations) (Correct)
....2 in III E) The service provider can devise the network resource to provide a variety of services and is rewarded with extra compensation for the services. There is no longer undersupply nor oversupply of the resource, users practically put themselves into the right categories of services [17]. B. The Formal Definition Formally, a mechanism is a game with players, outcomes, players strategies, outcome functions and players payoff functions. We define the SPAC mechanism, SPAC , as follows. 1) Players: There are n 1 players including n agents, denoted by player i =1, n, and, ....
A. Odlyzko, "Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet," in Conference on Electronic Commerce (SIGecomm), 1999, pp. 140--47.
Pricing Virtual Paths with Quality-of-Service Guarantees as.. - Rasmusson (2001) (Correct)
....A router has two tra c classes, 1) the guaranteed class, and 2) the best e ort class. Packets in the rst class are guaranteed not to be dropped in case of congestion, while packets without valid credentials are handled in traditional best e ort manner. As with the Metro Pricing Scheme by Odlyzko [10], we only requires two tra c classes, but in the Metro Pricing scheme, prices are determined outside of the system in such a way that there is no congestion in the rst class, while in our model, prices are determined by demand, and rst class packets get to go rst if there is congestion. 4. ....
Andrew M. Odlyzko, Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 140-147, (1999). http://www.research.att.com/~amo/doc/paris.metro.pricing.ps
Incentive Engineering in Wireless LAN Based Access Networks - Liao, Wouhaybi, Campbell (2002) (19 citations) (Correct)
....to the IA service. There lies the inherent trade off in the offered services between the two classes. There are two ways to design service models that promote self differentiation among users: differentiated pricing or service classes tailored toward specific user groups. The Paris Metro Price [16] is an example of using two tier pricing to realize differentiated services without any additional network mechanisms. In contrast, the Alternative Best Effort service proposed in [8] is a good example of designing two alternative service classes, each of which is preferred by data and multimedia ....
....for adaptation by charging sessions that benefit from the adaptation, while compensating sessions that suffer from adaptation. However, the exact calculation of credits and charges are challenging and are not formulated in [3] In [9] the authors analyze the property of the Paris Metro Pricing [16] scheme within the context of wireless access service. The service offering is limited with no support for allocation stability. The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present an overview of our framework including the allocation price service menu and messaging protocol. We ....
A. M. Odlyzko. Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet. In Proc. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'99), pages 140--147, 1999.
Internet Traffic Engineering - Mortier (2002) (2 citations) (Correct)
....contribution to the congestion. This gives greater flexibility in network access than allowed by traditional CAC schemes. A variety of pricing algorithms have been proposed and studied, based on effective bandwidth [Courcoubetis97,Courcoubetis98a, Courcoubetis98c] traffic priority [Sairamesh95, Odlyzko99a, Odlyzko99b] and on achieving proportional fairness [Kelly97a,Kelly98] Implementation varies based on the underlying technology. Proposed schemes for ATM networks include use of pricing at connection admission to encourage users to correctly declare QOS parameters [Kelly97b] and use of ....
A.M. Odlyzko. Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet. In Proceedings ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'99), pages 140--147, 1999. (p 21)
Classes of Service Under Perfect Competition - And Technological Change (Correct)
....qualities of service will bene t from economies of scale across those di erent services: administrative services for example will be shared. But if one considers only the cost of moving packets over the Internet and one assumes, in no way a necessary assumption but a de nite possibility (see [4]) that separate sub networks are a ected to the di erent qualities of service, then the assumption will be satis ed. In the sequel we may therefore assume that a rm provides only a single quality of service: di erent rms may provide di erent qualities of service. In deciding what quality or ....
....would also be a major problem. Many networking experts have therefore claimed that the current fat dumb pipe model is best and argued that it will prevail due to the rapid decline in the cost of equipment. A discussion of the di erent predictions about the evolution of the Internet may be found in [4], where a speci c proposal, Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) is advocated. Much interesting information about the economics of the Internet is found at [5] An important aspect of the economy of the Internet is that the prices of the networking equipment are dropping very rapidly. One wonders about the ....
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Andrew M. Odlyzko. Paris metro pricing for the internet. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce EC'99, pages 140-147, Denver, CO, November 1999. ACM Press.
On Packet Marking At Priority Queues - Gibbens, Kelly (Correct)
....Cambridge, CB3 0BW, UK. Emails: Richard. Gibbens cl.cam.ac.uk and F.P.Kelly statslab.cam.ac.uk. given ratio, set by the network, through an adaptive scheduler. The incentive to an application to choose blue or green is based on the nature of the application s trac and on trac conditions. Odlyzko [16] describes an approach to pricing differen tiated services based on a partition of the network into logically separate channels, which differ only in the prices paid for them. The price per packet would vary from channel to channel: channels with higher prices would attract less trac and thereby ....
A.M. Odlyzko (1999) Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet. Proc. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 140-147. www.research.att.com/amo.
Internet Pricing in Light of the History of Communications - Andrew Odlyzko Att Self-citation (Odlyzko) (Correct)
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A. M. Odlyzko, Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet, in Proc. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC99) , ACM, 1999, pp. 140-147. Based on a 1997 unpublished manuscript, A modest proposal for preventing Internet congestion. Both available at hhttp://www.research.att.com/amoi.
On the Expected Payment of Mechanisms for Task Allocation - Artur Czumaj Amir (Correct)
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A. Odlyzko. Paris metro pricing for the internet. Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 140--147, 1999.
Differential Join Prices for Parallel Queues: Social - Optimality Dynamic Pricing (Correct)
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A. Odlyzko, "Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet", in the Proc. of ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, 1999, pp. 140-147.
Network Capacity Sharing with QoS as a Financial Derivative.. - Rasmusson (2002) (Correct)
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Andrew M. Odlyzko. Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 140--147, 1999.
Less-than-Best-Effort Services: Pricing and Scheduling - Hayel, Ros, Tuffin (2004) (Correct)
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A. Odlyzko, "Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet," in ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'99), 1999, pp. 140--147.
A Theoretical Framework for Analyzing Satellite-based.. - Services Marios.. (Correct)
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A. Odlyzko. Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-99), 1999.
On the Expected Payment of Mechanisms for Task Allocation - Czumaj, Ronen (2004) (3 citations) (Correct)
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Andrew Odlyzko. Paris metro pricing for the internet. In Proc. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'99), pages 140--147, 1999.
Pricing the Internet - A visual 3-Dimensional Evaluation Model - Nguyen, Armitage (2003) (Correct)
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. A. M. Odlyzko, "Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet," Proceedings of the 2nd Internation conference on Information and Comupation Economies, (ICE099), November 1999.
Protecting Electronic Commerce From Distributed - Denial-Of-Service Attacks Jos (2002) (Correct)
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A. Odlyzko,\Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet," in Proc. 1st ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (EC'99), ACM, 1999, pp. 140-147.
Pricing and admission control for QoS-enabled Internet - Li, Iraqi, Boutaba (2004) (Correct)
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A.M. Odlyzko, Paris metro pricing for the Internet, in: Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 1999, pp. 140--147.
Solving Optimization Problems among Selfish Agents - Ronen (2000) (6 citations) (Correct)
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Andrew Odlyzko. Paris metro pricing for the internet. In ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC99), pages 140--147, 1999.
Efficiency Loss in Market Mechanisms for Resource Allocation - Johari (2004) (Correct)
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A. M. Odlyzko. Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC '99), pages 140--147, 1999. (Cited on page 33.)
Wireless Incentive Engineering - Liao, Wouhaybi, Campbell (2003) (Correct)
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A. M. Odlyzko, "Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet," in Proc. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'99), 1999, pp. 140--147.
Analysis of a Static Pricing Scheme for Priority Services - Marbach (2004) (1 citation) (Correct)
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A. M. Odlyzko,\Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet," Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 140147, 1999.
A Price-Based Resource Allocation Mechanism for - Priority Services Peter (Correct)
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A. M. Odlyzko,\Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet," Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 140147, 1999.
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