F. Bauspie and H.-J. Knobloch "How to keep authenticity alive in a computer network", Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt 89, J.-J. Quisquater and J. Vandewalle (eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science 434, 38-46, Springer-Verlag (1990).  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... Har94b Knob94 YeLa93, Boyd94, Nybe94 Simm84 HMP94l Simm93 NyR93a NyR93b,NyRu94 HMP94c, HMP94f Sch91b Schn89, Sch91a ChEG87 FiSh86 Pive93 Pinc94 BrMc91 HoKn91 HoP94c HMP94i Chau82 CaPS94 HMP94g, HMP94h Okam92 HMP94k HMP94m SuHw91 HMP94a Sary90 HMP94h, HMP94j Pete93 Pete93 Gunt89 Gira91 BaKn89 Beth88 HMP94h, HMP94j HMP94h, HMP94j Burm94 Yaco91 YaSh89 Signature schemes Subl. Chann. Blind signatures Encryption Authentication Key exchange Message recovery Okam92 HMP94n Relationship between ElGamal based publications from 1984 1994 ElGamal related literature ....

F.Bauspieß, H.-J.Knobloch, "How to keep authenticity alive in a computer network ", Lecture Notes in Computer Science 434, Advances in Cryptology: Proc. Eurocrypt '89, Berlin: Springer Verlag, (1990), pp. 38 -- 46.

....as pointed out by Lim [Lim 94] His attack can be countermeasured if the receiver checks whether the session key h(y k B (mod p) has been used before. As this solution is not very practical we recommend not to use them. 7. 2 Self certified public keys By applying the ideas described in [BaKn89, Guen89] we can create identity based certificates for the public keys of identified users with distinguished names, which results in the self certified public keys [Gira91] They have the following properties: The public key can be computed as a function of the identity, the public ....

....done with all self certified public keys obtained from the MetaMessage recovery scheme. It can also be applied to other authentication protocols, e.g. ChEG87, BrMc90, Okam92] 7.2. 2 Authenticated key exchange To obtain a general authenticated key exchange protocol, we can apply the ideas from [BaKn89, Guen89] or the SELANE protocols [HoKn91] which both use selfcertified public keys. The first approach combines mutual authentication and Diffie Hellman key exchange [DiHe76] by using the (authentic) data exchanged during the authentication protocol to construct the session key. The session key ....

F.Bauspieß, H.-J.Knobloch, "How to keep authenticity alive in a computer network", Lecture Notes in Computer Science 434, Advances in Cryptology: Proc. Eurocrypt '89, Berlin: Springer Verlag, (1990), pp. 38 -- 46.

....signatures later. This simplifies the security problems, since it is not necessary to worry about monitoring a large secure authenticated file of information about users. There are several identity based cryptosystems that serve not only to authorize users, but also to generate session keys [3, 20, 23, 35, 36, 40]. They could be used very effectively in settings like that of the Sun NFS. Unfortunately, their running times are all comparable to those of the RSA and Diffie Hellman systems. It is desirable to find a scheme of this kind that would be as fast as some of the signature schemes that are known, ....

F. Bauspiess and H.-J. Knobloch, How to keep authenticity alive in a computer network, Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Eurocrypt '89, J.-J. Quisquater, ed., to appear.

....not authentic as pointed out by Lim [Lim 94] His attack can be countermeasured if the receiver checks whether the session key h(y k B ) has been used before. As this solution is not very practical we recommend not to use them. 7. 2 Self certified public keys By applying the ideas described in [BaKn89, Guen89] we can create identity based certificates for the public keys of identified users with distinguished names, which results in the self certified public keys [Gira91] They have the following properties: ffl The public key can be computed as a function of the identity, the public ....

....in computing self certified public keys Note that the computation of the self certified public keys is more efficient in some variants than in the previously known protocols. For example in variants MR I.3 and MR I. 4 we just need one exponentiation modulo p where in the proposed schemes in [BaKn89, Guen89] we need two exponentiations and one inversion. 7.2.1 Authentication schemes In the authentication schemes, the user Alice who wants to authenticate herself to the verifier Bob proves the knowledge of the discrete logarithm xA of her self certified public key y A : uA (ff; y Z ; r A ; ....

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F.Bauspieß, H.-J.Knobloch, "How to keep authenticity alive in a computer network ", Lecture Notes in Computer Science 434, Advances in Cryptology: Proc. Eurocrypt '89, Berlin: Springer Verlag, (1990), pp. 38--46.

No context found.

F. Bauspie and H.-J. Knobloch "How to keep authenticity alive in a computer network", Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt 89, J.-J. Quisquater and J. Vandewalle (eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science 434, 38-46, Springer-Verlag (1990).

No context found.

F. Bauspiess, H.-J. Knobloch, "How to keep authenticity alive in a computer network" in Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of Eurocrypt '89, pp. 38-46, Springer (1990).

No context found.

F.Bauspiess, H.-J.Knobloch, "How to keep authenticity alive in a computer network", Lecture Notes in Computer Science 434, Advances in Cryptology: Proc. Eurocrypt '89, Berlin: Springer Verlag, (1990), pp. 38--46.

No context found.

F. Bauspieß, H.-J. Knobloch, "How to keep authenticity alive in a computer network ", Lecture Notes in Computer Science 434, Advances in Cryptology: Proc. Eurocrypt '89, Berlin: Springer Verlag, (1990), pp. 38 -- 46.

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