Farrell, J. 1993. Meaning and credibility in cheap talk games. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 514-31.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....across locations. They show, under plausible additional assumptions, that equilibrium in their game must involve some attempt by the attacker to misrepresent his intentions (allocating force to both locations with positive probability) 4 See Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel s (1982) and Joseph Farrell s (1993) analyses of strategic communication of private information and intentions. Crawford and Sobel s equilibria have no active misrepresentation, only intentional vagueness, taking the extreme form of no transmission if the Sender s and Receiver s preferences differ enough to make the game effectively ....

....a 1, reflecting the lesser difficulty of an unanticipated invasion of Calais. Before playing this underlying game, the Sender sends the Receiver a costless, non binding, noiseless message, u or d, about his intended action, with u (d) representing action U (D) in a commonly understood language (Farrell (1993)) Players then choose their actions simultaneously. The structure of the game is common knowledge. These games differ from HM s in having costless and noiseless messages separate from the attacker s force allocation, simultaneous, 0 1 allocations of force to locations, and a payoff asymmetry ....

Farrell, Joseph (1993): "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 514-531.

.... proliferation of equilibria also occurs in games with communication (e.g. signaling games) To be able to pose restrictions on beliefs so that unreasonable equilibria could be eliminated, game theorists more closely examined notions of credibility of threats and consistency of beliefs (e.g. [100,54,41]) Grossman defines the notion of metastrategy which prescribes for each player s information set and his beliefs over the information set, the set of actions the player will follow. A metastrategy specifies a player s action when his beliefs are given by a probability distribution and he has ....

J. Farrell. Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games. In M. Dempster, editor, Mathematical Models in Economics. Oxford University Press, 1988.

....of conventions in games that are played repeatedly within a population (e.g. 64, 63, 31, 3] These conventions lead to a selection of one equilibrium by the agents. Another approach is using cheap talk , which may be roughly defined as nonbinding, non payoff relevant pre play communication [19, 30] for selecting an equilibrium. We propose that the convention for selecting an equilibrium be agreed upon by the designers of the agents, rather than evolve from repeated interactions. It should lead to an equilibrium that is Pareto optimal. We will discuss the convention which we propose in the ....

J. Farrell. Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games. In M. Dempster, editor, Mathematical Models in Economics. Oxford University Press, 1988.

....77, 42, 6] Crawford and Haller [12] and later Kramarz [48] investigated how the players of an iterated coordination game can converge on a pattern of coordinated play. Another approach is using cheap talk which may be roughly defined as non binding, non payoff relevant pre play communication [26, 39] for selecting an equilibrium. However, these papers do not address the problem of choosing between multiple equilibria in one shot, symmetric cooperative games, without communication. Our methods can be considered as a method for choosing among equilibrium points in such situations. 2 A ....

J. Farrell. Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games. In M. Dempster, editor, Mathematical Models in Economics. Oxford University Press, 1988.

....or as an equilibrium of a team theory problem or a game. There are finally a number of papers that ask how incentive constraints influence what actors will, and can, communicate. This includes mainly the cheap talk literature. Most work on this question, both theoretical (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Farrell, 1993; and Rabin and Sobel, 1996) and experimental (Blume, DeJong, Kim, and Sprinkle, 1998; and Crawford, 1998) have focussed on the multiplicity of equilibrium codes. This multiplicity is primarily driven by the many ways in which out of equilibrium messages can be interpreted by their receivers. The ....

Farrell, Joseph, "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap Talk Games", Games and Economic Behavior, 5, no.4, October, 514-31, 1993.

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Farrell, J. 1993. Meaning and credibility in cheap talk games. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 514-31.

No context found.

Joseph Farrell. Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games. Games and Economic Behavior, 5:514--531, 1993.

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