A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot, S.A. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, ISBN 0-8493-8523-7, 1996 Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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A Middleware Service for Mobile Ad Hoc Data Sharing.. - Boulkenafed, Issarny (2003) (2 citations) (Correct)
....user s data. However, as our platform aims to run on resource constrained terminals, it is necessary to balance strong security enforcement with resource consumption, and in particular energy. For authentication purposes, a trusted third party (e.g. home server) issues Digital Certificates (DC) [21] to users devices after proper verification of their IDs. The use of DC avoids the need for a trusted, online, third party. A DC includes the user s public key, validity period, the domain name (defined by the home server, e.g. the name of the European project) to which the user belongs, etc. ....
Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, and Scott A. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 4th edition edition, 1996. http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/.
Improving Divide and Conquer Attacks against.. - Schindler, Koeune.. (2001) (2 citations) (Correct)
....and = c cER else. The sources of our timing attack are time di erences which are caused by di erent numbers of extra reductions within the for loop of Algorithm 1. Remark 2. Many implementations (among which Cascade) use a more ecient multiprecision variant of Montgomery s algorithm (see e.g. [9], Algorithm 14.36) than the one listed above. This in uences the absolute value of the constants c and c ER but not the fact whether an extra reduction is necessary ( 14] Remark 1) We hence clearly analyze the simplest variant of Montgomery s algorithm described above. Let t : Time(y (mod M ....
A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot, and S.C. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, Boca Raton, CRC Press (1997).
Token-based Web Single Signon with Enabled Clients - Pfitzmann, Waidner (2002) (1 citation) (Correct)
....the envelopes might be 4 slightly different. What, however, is the really distinguishing feature from other authentication and key exchange protocols Classical three party authentication protocols like Kerberos and NeedhamSchroeder start with a key exchange or key confirmation phase (see, e.g. [MOV97]) The client application then uses the new or confirmed key for encryption and authentication. Thus with symmetric keys only, the identity provider is a key distribution center, otherwise an online certification authority. No such three party key exchange is present in the LEC protocol. ....
Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, Scott A. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, Boca Raton 1997
Credential Management and Secure Single Login for SPKM - Hühnlein (Correct)
....smaller in other implementations. e.g. SECUDE uses 15 bases for the MillerRabin pseudo primality test and trial division with the first 1000 primes. Neglecting the trial division this corresponds to a probability # 2 ,121 ,thatp and q are composite 384 bit numbers instead of primes (see [23], page 147) Finally we need another 315 multiplications to sign the certificate containing the temporary public key. Thus we need about 108315 modular (1024 bit) multiplications in total. 3.3.3 Every GSS context establishment We have to perform two (768 bit) RSA encryptions and two (768 bit) ....
A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot, S.A. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, ISBN 0-8493-8523-7, 1996
Modification of Internet Key Exchange Resistant against.. - Matsuura, Imai (2000) (Correct)
....cost and the memory cost caused by bogus requests. Keywords: Internet Key Exchange, Denial of Service, security, Cookie 1 Introduction The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) 1] is based on a Diffie Hellman key agreement protocol [2] In order to protect the protocol from man in the middle attack[3], the first phase of IKE is authenticated with public key primitives. Since the public key primitives are computationally expensive, malicious entities can initiate a Denial of Service (DoS) attack; they may launch quite a large number of bogus requests to exhaust the computational resource of ....
....R kCKY I kSAbkIDR ) 2) where SKEYID is the output of a pseudo random function; for PKE authentication, SKEYID=prf (hash (N I kNR ) CKY I kCKY R ) 3) while SKEYID =prf (N I kNR ; g xy ) 4) for SIG authentication. k represents concatenation. CERT is a certificate payload and the brackets [3] indicate that the content of it (3) is optional. HASH (1) is a hash of the certificate which the initiator uses in encryption. The resultant keying materials are pseudo randomly computed by using SKEYID as: SKEYID d = prf (SKEYID ; g xy kCKY I kCKY R k0) 5) SKEYID a = prf (SKEYID ; SKEYID d ....
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A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, Inc., Boca Raton, Florida, 1996.
Unleashing the Full Power of Timing Attack - Schindler, Koeune (2001) (2 citations) (Correct)
.... of the Cascade cryptographic library, however, was later modi ed to resist against timing attacks: see [3] CG 2001 3 Unleashing the full power of timing attack 5 Remark: Many implementations (among which Cascade) use a more ef cient multiprecision variant of Montgomery s algorithm (see e.g. [8], Algorithm 14.36) than the one listed above. This in uences the absolute value of the constants c and c ER but, however, not the fact whether an extra reduction is necessary ( 11] Remark 1) For the sake of simplicity, we will therefore analyze the simplest variant of Montgomery s algorithm ....
A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot, and S.C. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, Boca Raton, CRC Press (1997).
Proof of Authorship for Copyright Protection in OPELIX - Schneider, Keinz (2001) (1 citation) (Correct)
....protocol which is available as a draft [PiKa00] However, our ideas are not in contradiction to these activities whatever their result will be. 3. SECURITY TECHNOLOGY Before presenting the timestamp protocol, we introduce briefly the underlying security techniques. For more details we refer to [MevO97]. The prerequisites for timestamps can be classified in the availability of some specific infrastructures and of secure cryptographic primitives. The functional components of the infrastructure are the certification authorities (CA) for public keys, e.g. see [X.509] and the TSA. Both ....
....Loosely spoken, digital signatures can be understood as the electronic equivalent of handwritten signatures. They were first sketched in [DiHe76] and meanwhile, there exist several standards for digital signatures, e.g. DSS [DSS00] An extensive overview on digital signatures can be found in [MevO97]. In the electronic world, digital signatures bind pieces of information to identities. Thereby, no other party should be able to create a digital signature binding a statement to the person s identity. Therefore, this person uses a secret a secret cryptographic key to calculate the digital ....
Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, Scott A. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1997.
A Phase Model for E-Commerce Business Models and Its.. - Hauswirth, Jazayeri, .. (Correct)
....must be considered. e.g. a wiretapper who is interested in what a specific person buys or how often a vendor sells a specific product. This problem can be easily solved by exchanging encrypted messages. Several encryption methods and ways for exchanging cryptographic keys can be used here [9]. Fraud: In this classification fraud covers different intentions of malicious parties that can either be inside or outside the business relationship. It comprises masquerading of parties, manipulation of messages, repudiation of binding agreements, and theft of goods. Secure systems must be ....
....already have the quality for the introduction of non repudiation, as will be discussed below. e.g. a message authentication code (MAC) would be no sufficient evidence to convince third parties undoubtedly that a message originated from a claiming party, whereas a digitally signed message would [9]. Manipulation of messages is another security problem in business relationships that has to be prevented. e.g. an attacker that is not involved in the business relationship could increase the prices in offers on their way to a customer to dissuade him her. The motivation to manipulate messages ....
A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, S. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997
A Phase Model for E-Commerce Business Models and its.. - Hauswirth, Jazayeri, .. (Correct)
....relationship must be considered, e.g. a wiretapper who is interested in what a specific person buys or how often a vendor sells a specific product. This problem can be easily solved by encrypting messages. Several encryption methods and ways for exchanging cryptographic keys can be used here [9]. Fraud: In this classification fraud covers different intentions of malicious parties that can either be inside or outside the business relationship. It comprises masquerading of parties, manipulation of messages, repudiation of binding agreements, and theft of goods. Secure systems must be able ....
A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, S. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997
Credential Management and Secure Single Login for SPKM - Hühnlein (Correct)
....smaller in other implementations. e.g. SECUDE uses 15 bases for the MillerRabin pseudo primality test and trial division with the first 1000 primes. Neglecting the trial division this corresponds to a probability 2 Gamma121 , that p and q are composite 384 bit numbers instead of primes (see [23], page 147) Finally we need another 315 multiplications to sign the certificate containing the temporary public key. Thus we need about 108315 modular (1024 bit) multiplications in total. 3.3.3 Every GSS context establishment We have to perform two (768 bit) RSA encryptions and two (768 bit) ....
A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot, S.A. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, ISBN 0-8493-8523-7, 1996
Credential Management and Secure Single Login for SPKM - Hühnlein (1997) (Correct)
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A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot, S.A. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, ISBN 0-8493-8523-7, 1996
Direct Division in Factor Rings - Fitzpatrick, Wolf (2004) (Correct)
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ALFRED J. MENEZES and PAUL C. VAN OORSCHOT and SCOTT A. VANSTONE: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/
Password Based Key Exchange with Mutual Authentication - Jiang, Gong (2004) (2 citations) (Correct)
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Alfred Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, Scott A. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press 1996. 12
Security of Signed ElGamal Encryption - Schnorr, Jakobsson (1999) (27 citations) (Correct)
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A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot and S. Vanstone : Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, Inc., 1996.
A Phase Model for E-Commerce Business Models and its.. - Hauswirth, Jazayeri, .. (2001) (Correct)
No context found.
A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, S. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997
Algebraic Attacks on Stream Ciphers with Linear Feedback - Courtois, Meier (2003) (29 citations) (Correct)
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Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, Scott A. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press.
Stream Cipher Based on Quasigroup String Transformations in Z*_p - Gligoroski (2004) (Correct)
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A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, Inc., October 1997.
Securing a Unix Server - Msc Thesis In (Correct)
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A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, S. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, October 1996, http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/
Algebraic Attacks on Combiners with Memory and Several Outputs - Courtois (2003) (7 citations) (Correct)
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Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, Scott A. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, Chapter 6, CRC Press.
On Infinite Class Of Strongly Collision Resistant Hash .. - Gligoroski.. (2003) (Correct)
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A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, Inc., 1997
Improved Public Key Cryptosystem Using Finite Non Abelian.. - Paeng, Kwon, Ha, Kim (2001) (1 citation) (Correct)
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A. J. Menezes, P. C. Van Oorschot, S. A. Vanstone \Handbook of applied cryptography", CRC press, (1997) 10
Security of Signed ElGamal Encryption - Schnorr, Jakobsson (2000) (27 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot and S. Vanstone : Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, Inc., 1996.
Security of Signed ElGamal Encryption - Schnorr, Jakobsson (1999) (27 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot and S. Vanstone : Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, Inc., 1996.
Security of Signed ElGamal Encryption (Extended Abstract) - Schnorr, Jakobsson (2000) (Correct)
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A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot and S.A. Vanstone : Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, Inc., Boca Raton, Florida 33431, 1996. 11
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