Michael H. Rothkopf, Aleksandar Pekec, and Ronald M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinational auctions. Management Science, 44(8):1131--1147, 1998.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....market was more efficient than a sequence of bilateral markets. The entire issue of what is the best market mechanism posted prices, auctions, bidding, and various hybrids will be one of the most important issues explored in the research (see [14] for a general discussion of market mechanisms, [15] for a computationally efficient procedure for the combinational auction that can be used to purchase compound goods, and [16] for a discussion of the links between combinatorial auctions and Lagrangean relaxation for the job shop schedulLng problem) Unlike most of the agent mediated markets ....

Rothkopf, M.H., Pekec, A., and Harstad, R.M., "Computationally manageable combinational auctions," Management Sci., 44(8): 1131-1147, 1998.

....has stressed the agent aspect, i.e. that the trading parties are locally optimizing entities [Faratin00] Combinatorial markets, i.e. trading of bundles of distinct resources is yet a relatively new area. Somewhat related to combinatorial markets is the area of combinatorial auctions [Rassenti82] [Rothkopf98] [Sandholm99] Derivatives have to our knowledge only been used for network admission control by [Lazar98] Previous bandwidth market models usually only include a primary market, in which end users can buy and sell capacity only from the router owner. In the presented model end users (or their ....

Michael G, Rothkopf, Aleksandar Peke, and Ronald M. Harstad, Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions, Management Science, (44) no. 8, Aug. 1998.

....For each hypothesis, there may be some substrings of H to which the hypothesis could apply. As a hypothesis may seem more plausible in one position than in another position, it is again meaningful to model this problem as WJISP 1 with arbitrary weights. Combinatorial Auctions (see Rothkopf et al. [22]) Due to the ongoing sale of frequencies to providers of mobile telecommunications, and due to the ever increasing popularity of e commerce, the design of (combinatorial) auctions has become a popular research item. In a combinatorial auction di#erent assets are for sale and bidders are allowed ....

....an asset can be sold at most once) In some cases the assets for sale posses a special structure, for instance when they can be linearly ordered. A popular example is the case where frequencies are auctioned (indeed frequencies can be ordered by their magnitude) but other examples exist (see [22]) Suppose further that we allow only bids for sets of consecutive assets and allow at most one acceptance for each bidder (see [22, 18] Then the problem of maximizing total revenue for this setting (the interval auction problem) becomes an instance of WJISP 1 : a bidder is a job, their bids are ....

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M. H. Rothkopf, A. Pekec, and R. M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinational auctions. Management Science, 44:1131--1147, 1998.

....clearing involves two steps. First, the auction must identify the bids that vill be part of the transaction set. This step is referred to as wimcr dctcrmizatioz. In general, solving the winner determination problem in a combinatoffal auction is NP complete, although tractable special cases exist [21]. Fujishima et al. IS] and Sandholm [22] have developed specialized algorithms for combinatorial winner determination that combine clever pruning techniques with depth first search. These algorithms have performed vell on problems with thousands of bids. More recently, several authors [1, 5, 18] ....

....those bundles that have received offers, since the agents can easily perform the inference to determine minimal prices for the rest of the bundles. The auction design is directly applicable to situations vhere bids are restricted in order to admit polynomial time al gorithms for computing f [21]. It is equally vell defined vhether the bids are sparse or dense. In addition, ve can straightforvardly substitute approximation algorithms into step 1 of the price setting procedure. In such cases, the auction can use the better of the previous best allocation and the nevly computed approximate ....

M. H. Rothkopf, A. Peke, and R. M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinational auctions. Management Science, 44(8):1131 1147, 1998.

....there are mechanisms that force the participants to reveal their utility. Single issue auctions do not provide satisfactory mechanism for most business transactions. Therefore efforts are being made to extend the action formats to multiple issue auctions [2, 3, 30] and combinatorial auctions [1, 31, 32]. Are All Negotiations Auctions 7 Che and Branco discuss multidimensional auctions, mainly from a theoretical basis and the economics perspective [2, 30] Their work involves the development of a scoring rule for the auction owner, who uses this to evaluate the bids. Teich et al. 3,8] apply a ....

Rothkopf, M., A. Pekec, and R.M. Harsta, Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions. Management Science, 1998. 44: 131:148.

....communication, or incentive engineering. For example, single price points may be considered easier to specify than complete schedules. As another example, requiring that offers be divisible may simplify clearing calculations (discussed in Section 4) In the combinatorial context, Rothkopf et al. [34] present several cases where restricting the expressive power of bids allows polynomial time computation of optimal allocations in multidimensional auctions for discrete resources. 3.1.2. Buyers and Sellers Typically, we classify auctions by whether they have one buyer or many buyers, and one ....

Michael H. Rothkopf, Aleksander Pekec, and Ronald M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinational auctions. Management Science, 44(8):1131--1147, 1998.

....of 12 communication outweigh the costs of managing the auction, it is still useful to de ne ecient algorithms for the mediators. This is especially relevant to auctions covering multiple commodities, in which clearing prices are often determined by combinatorial optimization. Rothkopf et al. [16] study restrictions in allowable multicommodity bundles that enable tractable solution of the auction s optimization problem. Even when each auction faces a tractable problem, we might obtain significant computational savings by careful management of the communication and clearing operations. ....

Michael H. Rothkopf, Aleksander Pekec, and Ronald M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinational auctions. Management Science, to appear. 20

....synergies on combinations of properties in such a way that will be both fair to the bidders and practical to implement. The most obvious approach is to permit bids on groups of properties, called combinatorial bids. Without the allowance of combinatorial bids, bidders will face exposure risk (Rothkopf, Pekec and Harstad 1998). Suppose that an individual bidder has a synergy that is specific to him on a particular block of properties. He may find that an unsuccessful attempt to acquire the block leads him to commit to a price for a group of properties that is higher than what they are worth to him. Alternatively, he ....

....people access to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) regardless of where they are located. PCS includes not only POTS ( Plain Old Telephone Service ) but also data, facsimile, video communication, and other services. 2 The PCS auction was developed through the efforts of many people. Rothkopf, Pekec and Harstad (1998) provide complete details. 2 flexibility. Bid Withdrawals. A leading bidder is permitted to withdraw his bid during the course of the auction, but is penalized by being required to pay the difference between his bid and the price for which the license is ultimately sold; a winning bidder ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Rothkopf, M.H., A. Pekec, R.M. Harstad. 1998. Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions. Management Science 44 1131-1147.

....synergies on combinations of properties in such a way that will be both fair to the bidders and practical to implement. The most obvious approach is to permit bids on groups of properties, called combinatorial bids. Without the allowance of combinatorial bids, bidders will face exposure risk (Rothkopf, Pekec and Harstad 1998). Suppose that an individual bidder has a synergy that is specific to him on a particular block of properties. He may find that an unsuccessful attempt to acquire the block leads him to commit to a price for a group of properties that is higher than what they are worth to him. Alternatively, he ....

....people access to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) regardless of where they are located. PCS includes not only POTS ( Plain Old Telephone Service ) but also data, facsimile, video communication, and other services. 2 The PCS auction was developed through the e#orts of many people. Rothkopf, Pekec and Harstad (1998) provide complete details. 2 Bid Withdrawals. A leading bidder is permitted to withdraw his bid during the course of the auction, but is penalized by being required to pay the di#erence between his bid and the price for which the license is ultimately sold; a winning bidder withdrawing after the ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Rothkopf, M.H., A. Pekec, R.M. Harstad. 1998. Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions. Management Science 44 1131-1147.

....of 12 communication outweigh the costs of managing the auction, it is still useful to define efficient algorithms for the mediators. This is especially relevant to auctions covering multiple commodities, in which clearing prices are often determined bycombinatorial optimization. Rothkopf et al. [16] study restrictions in allowable multicommodity bundles that enable tractable solution of the auction s optimization problem. Even when each auction faces a tractable problem, wemight obtain significant computational savings by careful management of the communication and clearing operations. ....

Michael H. Rothkopf, Aleksander Pekec, and Ronald M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinational auctions. Management Science, to appear. 20

....communication, or incentive engineering. For example, single price points may be considered easier to specify than complete schedules. As another example, requiring that offers be divisible may simplify clearing calculations (discussed in Section 4) In the combinatorial context, Rothkopf et al. [34] present several cases where restricting the expressive power of bids allows polynomial time computation of optimal allocations in multidimensional auctions for discrete resources. 3.1.2. Buyers and Sellers Typically, we classify auctions by whether they have one buyer or many buyers, and one ....

Michael H. Rothkopf, Aleksander Pekec, and Ronald M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinational auctions. Management Science, 44(8):1131--1147, 1998.

....communication, or incentive engineering. For example, single price points may be considered easier to specify than complete schedules. As another example, requiring that offers be divisible may simplify clearing calculations (discussed in Section 4) In the combinatorial context, Rothkopf et al. [33] present several cases where restricting the expressive power of bids allows polynomial time computation of optimal allocations in multidimensional auctions for discrete resources. 3.1.2 Buyers and Sellers Typically, we classify auctions by whether they have one buyer or many buyers, and one ....

Michael H. Rothkopf, Aleksander Pekec, and Ronald M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinational auctions. Management Science, 44(8):1131--1147, 1998.

....assets can be determined. Without the divisibility assumption, auction markets that accept bundle orders lead to computational problems that are not polynomial (NP Hard) and do not provide price guidance for the individual assets. For one sided bundle auctions of private goods, Rothkopf et al. [23] proposed a model that maximizes the revenue of suchacombinational auction. While the general model is NP hard to solve [3] Rothkopf et al. have identified some special cases where restrictions are placed on possible combinations and can therefore be solved in polynomial time. All of the above ....

Rothkopf, M. H., A. Pekec, R. M. Harstad 1998, Computationally manageable combinational auctions. Management Science 44(8), 1131-1147.

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Michael H. Rothkopf, Aleksandar Pekec, and Ronald M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinational auctions. Management Science, 44(8):1131--1147, 1998.

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M. H. Rothkopf, A. Pekec, and R. M. Harstad. Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions. Management Science, 44(8), August 1998.

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Rothkopf, M.H., Pekec, A., Harstad, R.M.: Computationally manageable combinational auctions. Management Science 44 (1998) 1131--1147

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M. H. Rothkopf, A. Pekec, and R. M. Harstad. Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions. Management Science, 44(8), August 1998.

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Michael H. Rothkopf, Aleksandar Pekec, and Ronald M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinational auctions. Management Science, 44(8), August 1998.

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Michael H. Rothkopf, Aleksandar Pekec, and Ronald M. Harstad. Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions. Management Science, 44(8), August 1998.

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M. H. Rothkopf, A. Pekec, and R. M. Harstad. Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions. Management Science, 44(8), August 1998.

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M. Rothkopf, A. Pekec, R. Harstad, \Computationally manageable combinational auctions", Management Science, 44, pp1131-47, 1998.

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Michael H. Rothkopf, Aleksandar Pekec, and Ronald M. Harstad. Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions. Management Science, 44(8), August 1998.

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M. H. Rothkopf, A. Pekec, and R. M. Harstad. Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions. Management Science, 44(8), August 1998.

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Michael H. Rothkopf, Aleksandar Pekec, and Ronald M. Harstad. Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions. Management Science, 44(8), August 1998.

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