R. Tuomela and K. Miller. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53:367-389, 1988.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... of a cognition is a function of the number and the importance of the elements with which it is coherent, also depending on 5With the individual qualifter in both, we mean that we do not re fer to notions of we intention or collective intentions such as those developed by Searle [26] or Tuomela [31]. Here, intentions are classical private intentions. 6Although, we give a first account here, much more work should be done on this point. Intention to , i Action commitments from X to Y i [ Offer i Acti . itments from YtoX . i Request Intention that = i i Propositionnal ....

R. Tuomela and K. Miller. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53:367-389, 1988.

....a collective motivational attitude to be present. In this way, we hope to make the behavior of a team easier to predict. In the philosophical and MAS literature there is an ongoing discussion whether collective intentions may be reduced to individual ones plus collective beliefs about them (see [21, 3, 15]) Even though our de nitions seem to be reductive, they involve xed point constructions, and for this reason they are deeper than a simple compound built out of individual intentions and collective beliefs about them by propositional connectives only. Let us stress again that we have tried to ....

....only. Let us stress again that we have tried to nd minimal conditions for collective intentions to be present, and not to weigh down the de nitions with all aspects that may play a part. Such elements as conventions, abilities, opportunities, power relations and social structure (see [21, 22] for a thorough discussion) certainly are important, and we leave open the possibility of de ning and using them in speci c cases where they play a crucial role, for example in the form of additional axioms. 5.1 Collective Intentions: the Standard Case In this paper, we focus on strictly ....

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R. Tuomela and K. Miller. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53:367-390, 1988.

.... on the other hand, are reflected in the definitions of collective commitments (see the forthcoming paper) In the philosophical and MAS literature there is an ongoing discussion as to whether collective intentions may be reduced to individual ones plus collective beliefs about them (see [4, 21, 33]) Even though our definition seems to be reductive, it involves nested intentions and collective epistemic operators, and for this reason is deeper than a simple compound built out of individual intentions and collective beliefs about them by propositional connectives only. 4.1. Collective ....

Tuomela, R., Miller, K.: We-intentions, Philosophical Studies, 53, 1988, 367--390.

....group member intends that each group member holds some mental attitude. In the last few years much work has been done both in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) and in the philosophy of mind towards a principled representation of the mentalistic apparatus involved in collaborative activity [14, 20, 42, 54, 84]. Although most of this work agrees in arguing that a formalization of cooperation is grounded upon the formalization of the mental states of the involved agents, there is however no consensus about the connection between individual and joint mental attitudes. Various constraints on, and ....

....initial commitment. 9. 3 Models of decision making within multi agent systems Many aspects of CDM have been studied by researchers from a variety of disciplines, such as DAI [11, 27, 38, 40, 59, 82, 86, 87, 88] economics [10, 58] organizational behaviour theory [28, 55, 60, 61, 63] philosophy [14, 83, 84], and sociology [5, 17, 43, 81] We can distinguish between two main categories of models of CDM: a) high level formal architectures for decision making within a social setting; and (b) implementation architectures aimed at helping practitioners to realise software systems for managing ....

R. Tuomela and K. Miller. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53, 115--137, 1988.

....group member intends that each group member holds some mental attitude. In the last few years much work has been done both in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) and in the philosophy of mind towards a principled representation of the mentalistic apparatus involved in collaborative activity [14, 20, 42, 54, 84]. Although most of this work agrees in arguing that a formalization of cooperation is grounded upon the formalization of the mental states of the involved agents, there is however no consensus about the connection between individual and joint mental attitudes. Various constraints on, and ....

....initial commitment. 9. 3 Models of decision making within multi agent systems Many aspects of CDM have been studied by researchers from a variety of disciplines, such as DAI [11, 27, 38, 40, 59, 82, 86, 87, 88] economics [10, 58] organizational behaviour theory [28, 55, 60, 61, 63] philosophy [14, 83, 84], and sociology [5, 17, 43, 81] We can distinguish between two main categories of models of CDM: a) high level formal architectures for decision making within a social setting; and (b) implementation architectures aimed at helping practitioners to realise software systems for managing ....

R. Tuomela and K. Miller. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53, 115--137, 1988.

....lowest level of detail. However, if there is a significant deviation from the expectation, the high level plan has to be revised. At the high level agents will be specified as practical reasoners (BDI like) and plans as complex mental attitudes, as joint commitments to attain a common team goal [1, 2, 14, 26, 33, 43]. Each agent will reason about how to instantiate its intentions to achieve its subgoal according to the knowledge acquired during the simulation. We plan to initially implement our MAS in Progol [30] a specific Prolog ILP system that is being developed in the AI research group at the University ....

R. Tuomela and K. Miller. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53:367--389, 1990.

....collective motivational attitudes to be present. In this way, we hope to make the behavior of a team easier to predict. In the philosophical and MAS literature there is an ongoing discussion whether collective intentions may be reduced to individual ones plus collective beliefs about them (see [29, 2, 17]) Even though our definition seems to be reductive, it involves nested intentions and collective epistemic operators, and for this reason is deeper than a simple compound built out of individual intentions and collective beliefs about them by propositional connectives only. Let us stress again ....

R. Tuomela and K. Miller. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53:367--390, 1988.

....were available in the literature, although no one model was sufficient to be used directly in this work. Jennings presents a detailed review and comparison of the prominent models [39] and notes that the following points were made about cooperative problem solving: agents must have a joint goal [18, 51, 52, 61, 65, 74] 13 . agents must agree they wish to cooperate to achieve their joint goal [18, 51, 65, 74] agents must agree a common recipe for attaining their joint goal [52] actions performed by different agents, in the context of the joint action, are interdependent [52, 61] agents must have ....

....Jennings presents a detailed review and comparison of the prominent models [39] and notes that the following points were made about cooperative problem solving: agents must have a joint goal [18, 51, 52, 61, 65, 74] 13 . agents must agree they wish to cooperate to achieve their joint goal [18, 51, 65, 74] . agents must agree a common recipe for attaining their joint goal [52] actions performed by different agents, in the context of the joint action, are interdependent [52, 61] agents must have conventions for monitoring the viability of their commitments [51] Almost all of the ....

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R. Tuomela and K. Miller, We-Intentions, Philosophical Studies 53 (1988) 367-389.

....11 4.4 Caract eristiques d un agent L avancement des travaux en iad et sma a conduit les chercheurs a d efinir non seulement la notion d agent mais aussi quelques unes de ses caract eristiques 11 . Intentionnalit e Un agent intentionnel est un agent guid e par ses buts. Une intention [70] [77] [69] est la d eclaration explicite des buts et des moyens d y parvenir. Elle exprime donc la volont e d un agent d atteindre un but ou d effectuer une action. Notons que la notion d intentionnalit e n existe pas chez Minsky 12 . Rationalit e Un agent rationnel est un agent qui suit le ....

Tuomela, Raimo, Kaarl, and Miller. We intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53:367--389, 1988.

....about a task [7, 8] we have analyzed how joint intentions to engage in the task lead to the discourse goals that underlie various speech acts. 8 Comparison with Other Analyses of Joint Intention Numerous analyses of concepts similar to joint intention have been given. Tuomela and Miller [22] propose a conceptual analysis of an individual agent s we intending a group action. Essentially, that agent must intend to do her part of the action and believe it is mutually believed that the other members of the team will do their parts as well. Power [18] is perhaps the earliest researcher ....

R. Tuomela and K. Miller. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53:367--389, 1988.

....is reduced to individual attitudes. For example, joint intention towards a plan is defined in terms of the conjunction of individual intentions, together with (mutual) beliefs about the intentions of others and about the relationship between the role plans and the joint plan, cf. Searle, 1990; Tuomela and Miller, 1988 ] Related work in progress seeks to extend the plan representation language to allow for explicit representation and reasoning about team skills and resources, and studies the problems of team formation, plan selection, and role assignment [ Sonenberg et al. 1992 ] We are also developing an ....

R. Tuomela and K. Miller. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53:367--389, 1988.

....and the corresponding deduction. Hence although not every member believes that the goal is achievable, the whole team does not yet believe that the goal is unachievable. 2. 3 Joint Intentions To overcome the limitations of individual intentions, researchers started investigating joint intentions [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30] indeed it has been argued that the basic premises of commitments and conventions which are central to the joint intention work are the basis of all coordination mechanisms [22] Joint intentions can be intuitively defined as a joint commitment to perform a collective action while in a certain ....

....the other not. Previous work has addressed various aspects of this shared mental state; although no individual formulation is anything like complete. A comprehensive review of these extant models highlighted the list of important features given below [22] agents must: agree on a common goal [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30] . agree they wish to collaborate to achieve their shared aim [24, 25, 28, 30] agree a common means (plan) of reaching their objective [25, 26] acknowledge that actions performed by different agents are related [25, 26, 29] have criteria for tracking the rationality of their commitments ....

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R. Tuomela and K. Miller, We-Intentions, Philosophical Studies 53 (1988) 367-389.

....In support of these mutual commitments, teams involve an inherent overhead in establishing, monitoring, and disbanding the team. A theory of joint action therefore needs to explain how this occurs. Unfortunately, although there are numerous analyses of joint action in the literature (e. g, [4, 12, 19, 18, 44, 43, 36] how agents in fact form and disband teams is rarely discussed. In some cases, it is suggested that joint activities are formed by agreements, but that concept is left relatively unformalized. To be of theoretical and practical utility, the informal notion of an agreement needs to be cashed out ....

R. Tuomela and K. Miller. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53:367--389, 1988.

....1989; Nakashima et al. 1991; Halpern and Moses, 1990 ] in this area address some of these problems. Recent work on other collective mental attitudes, such as joint goals and joint intentions, includes [ Bratman, 1991; Gilbert, 1989; Grosz and Sidner, 1990; Levesque et al. 1990; Searle, 1990; Tuomela and Miller, 1988 ] In formalizing joint intention, one can treat the collective notion as irreducible [ Searle, 1990 ] or, as we do below, one can regard a joint intention as definable in terms of the conjunction of individual intentions together with mutual beliefs about the intentions of other individuals [ ....

.... the collective notion as irreducible [ Searle, 1990 ] or, as we do below, one can regard a joint intention as definable in terms of the conjunction of individual intentions together with mutual beliefs about the intentions of other individuals [ Grosz and Sidner, 1990; Levesque et al. 1990; Tuomela and Miller, 1988 ] For example, if two agents want to jointly lift a heavy table, each needs to individually intend to lift one end of the table and each needs to believe that the other agent will lift the other end. Clearly these individual intentions and beliefs are essential ingredients of the joint ....

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R. Tuomela and K. Miller. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53:367--389, 1988.

....of the body of an applicable plan at the leaf of an intention tree to be an observation action, i.e. the agent ff 2 is to observe the execution of the action a( t) by the agent ff 1 . Executing an observation action results in the action being added to the observation queue O. Definition 24 (Execution of an Observation) If i is an intention tree with its jth leaf of the form e:b #(ff 2 ; ff 1 ; a( t) h 2 ; h n then add h(ff 1 ; a( t) i; ji to the observation queue O. In the case of executing actions the agent physically executed these actions through its effectors. In ....

....by a number of agents that act like a team. When these joint execution plans are adopted by all the agents that form a team, we have a joint intention or an intention of the collective to cooperate with each other to achieve a joint goal or collectively react to an external environmental change [ 24 ] In this section, we shall first see how one can extend our language discussed earlier to joint execution plans and multiple agents and then consider the operational semantics of such an extended language. 4.1 Syntax: Joint Execution Plans Following our earlier definition of teams [ 11 ] we ....

R. Tuomela and K. Miller. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53:367--389, 1988.

....joint plan as an abstract specification gives us the expressive power to reason about joint commitment towards joint plans, as well as commitment towards a certain role in the joint plan a finer grade of commitment. Most work on joint mental attitudes [ Levesque et al. 1990; Rao et al. 1992; Tuomela and Miller, 1988 ] have concentrated on the semantics of these entities rather than the pragmatics of how to achieve them. This work concentrates on the latter aspect. In this sense our work is similar to the work of Halpern and Moses [ Halpern and Moses, 1990 ] which deals with the pragmatics of achieving ....

R. Tuomela and K. Miller. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53:367--389, 1988.

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