| A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In 13th Computer Security Foundations Workshop. IEEE, 2000. |
....short) proposed in [10] is a security property which is suitable to analyze processes in completely dynamic hostile environments, i.e. environments which can be dynamically recon gured at run time, changing in unpredictable ways. The notion of P BNDC is based on the idea of Non Interference [11, 19, 22] (formalized as BNDC [7] and requires that every state which is reachable by the system still satis es a basic Non Interference property. If this holds, one is This work has been partially supported by the MURST project Modelli formali per la sicurezza and the EU Contract IST 2001 32617 ....
....an increasing attention due to the augmented possibilities of interconnections and information exchanges. A number of formal de nitions of security properties has been proposed in the literature. In this paper we consider the security property P BNDC based on the idea of Non Interference [11, 19, 22] which has been deeply studied in [10] and showed to be suitable to guarantee security in a dynamically recon gurable context. We present a method to automatically construct a P BNDC process by a transformational approach. We show that the transformation preserves the low level observational ....
A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-threaded Programs. In Proc. of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200-215. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2000.
....to users running at low levels [8, 14, 5, 17, 22, 20] even in the presence of any possible malicious process. An early attempt to formalize the absence of information flow was the concept of noninterference proposed in the seminal paper by Goguen and Meseguer [9] and further developed in [5, 6, 3, 11, 18, 21, 10]. Intuitively, to establish that information does not flow from high to low it is sufficient to establish that high behavior has no effect on what low level users can observe, i.e. the low level view of the system is independent of high behavior. A process which is secure with respect to this ....
....based on a hook up (compositionality) property [13] of their notion of security. That is contexts just reflect the compositionality property of their security notion. Actually the compositionality of security properties is a fundamental issue in the incremental definition of secure systems (see [15, 23, 21]) In this work we point out a strong relation between the compositionality properties of a class of processes and the compositionality properties of contexts (see Theorem 4.18) Moreover, we can use our definition of secure contexts to identify new classes of secure processes. 7. ....
A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-threaded Programs. In Proc. of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200--215. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2000.
....short) proposed in [11] is a security property which is suitable to analyze processes in completely dynamic hostile environments, i.e. environments which can be dynamically recon gured at run time, changing in unpredictable ways. The notion of P BNDC is based on the idea of Non Interference [12, 25, 28] (formalized as BNDC [10] and requires that every state which is reachable by the system still satis es a basic Non Interference property. If this holds, one is assured that even if the environment changes during the execution no malicious attacker will be able to compromise the system, as every ....
....many other approaches to the ecient veri cation of information ow properties and it would be quite interesting to compare our approach with existing ones, in order to study possible relations and understand the relative merits. Among static analysis, there are some papers about types (see, e.g. [28, 25, 13, 5]) and control ow analysis (see, e.g. 2, 6] Another typical approach to bypass the state explosion problem, is to study compositional properties. Indeed, if a property is preserved when secure systems are composed, then the analysis may be performed on (sequential) subsystems and, in case ....
A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-threaded Programs. In Proc. of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200-215. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2000.
....systems for tracking information flow within programs are an attractive way to enforce security properties such as data confidentiality and integrity. Recent work has proposed a number of security typed languages whose type systems statically check information flow, ranging from simple calculi [28, 45, 17, 1, 38, 49, 41, 19, 18] to full featured languages [27, 50, 30, 4] Many systems for which information security is important are concurrent for example, web servers, databases, operating systems yet the problem of checking information flow in concurrent programming languages has not yet received a satisfactory ....
.... resolution of nondeterministic choices (in this case, scheduler choices) These attacks often exploit timing flows, covert channels that have long been considered difficult to control [20] Several recent papers have presented type systems for secure information flow in concurrent languages [43, 38, 41, 5, 19, 29, 36]. The type systems of these languages enforce secure information flow; but most of these type systems are so restrictive that programming becomes impractical. The secure concurrent language presented in this paper, SEC , addresses both of these limitations. # SEC has been proved to enforce a ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In Proc. of the 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200--214. IEEE Computer Society Press, July 2000.
....control ow and Modelli Formali per la sicurezza . A number of formal de nitions of security properties (see, for instance, 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 12, 14 16] has been proposed in the literature. In this paper we face the problem of de ning a security property based on the idea of Non Interference [9, 13, 16, 19] (formalized as BNDC [6] which is suitable to analyze processes in completely dynamic hostile environments. The basic idea is to require that every state which is reachable by the system still satis es a basic Non Interference property. If this holds, we are assured that even if the system ....
A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-threaded Programs. In Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200-215. IEEE Computer Society Press, July 2000.
....short) proposed in [11] is a security property which is suitable to analyze processes in completely dynamic hostile environments, i.e. environments which can be dynamically reconfigured at run time, changing in unpredictable ways. The notion of P BNDC is based on the idea of Non Interference [12, 25, 28] (formalized as BNDC [10] and requires that every state which is reachable by the system still satisfies a basic Non Interference property. If this holds, one is assured that even if the environment changes during the execution no malicious attacker will be able to compromise the system, as every ....
....of the new technique through the example of the Access Monitor. It is worthwhile noticing that there are many other approaches to the verification of information flow properties. For instance, there are verification techniques for information flow security which are based on types (see, e.g. [28, 25, 13, 5]) and control flow analysis (see, e.g. 2, 6] However, most of them are concerned with different models, e.g. trace semantics [15, 16, 18, 19] In this paper we follow the approach of Focardi and Gorrieri [10] and focus on bisimulation based information flow properties. To the best of our ....
A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-threaded Pro- grams. In Proc. of Computer Security Foundations Workshop. IEEE, 2000.
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200--214, July 2000.
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200--214, July 2000.
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200--214, July 2000.
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200--214, July 2000.
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200--214, July 2000.
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands, "Probabilistic noninterference for multithreaded programs," in Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, July 2000, pp. 200--214.
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In 13th Computer Security Foundations Workshop. IEEE, 2000.
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. 13th Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'00), IEEE Computer Society Press, 2000, 200-214.
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multithreaded programs. In IEEE, editor, 13th Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2000.
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In 13th Computer Security Foundations Workshop. IEEE, 2000.
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic Noninterference for Multithreaded Programs. In Proc. of 13th Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'00), IEEE CS Press, pp. 200--215, 2000.
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Sabelfeld, A., and D. Sands, Probabilistic Noninterference for Multithreaded Programs, in Proc. 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'00), pp. 200--214, 2000.
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Andrei Sabelfeld and David Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In Proceedings of the 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200-214, 2000.
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In Proceedings of the 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundation Workshop, Cambridge (UK), 2000. IEEE press.
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A. Sabelfeld, D. Sands, \Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-threaded Programs", in Proc. of the 13th Computer Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE CS Press, 2000 9
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-threaded Programs. In Proc. of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'00), pages 200-215. IEEE Comp. Soc. Press, 2000.
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A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-threaded Programs. In Proc. of Computer Security Foundations Workshop. IEEE, 2000.
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Andrei Sabelfeld and David Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In Proc. 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200--214. IEEE Computer Society Press, July 2000.
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A. Sabelfed and D. Sands. Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-threaded Programs. In Proc. of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200--215. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2000.
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