Ochs, J. (1995) Coordination problems, in J.H.Kagel and A.E. Roth (Eds.) Handbook of experimental economics, Princeton: princeton University Press, pp. 195-251. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
An Experimental Study Of Costly Coordination - Goeree, Holt (1998) (Correct)
....agents somehow find the Pareto dominant equilibrium. Indeed, some of the most widely cited results from laboratory experiments provide cases where subjects end up at the Nash equilibrium that is worst for all concerned (Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil, 1990; Cooper et al. 1992; and the survey in Ochs, 1995). Since much of the theoretical work was motivated by the need to explain coordination failures in the laboratory, it This project was funded in part by the National Science Foundation (SBR 9818683) We wish to thank Vince Crawford and Robert Rosenthal for useful discussion and Rachel Parkin ....
Ochs, Jack (1995) "Coordination Problems," in J. Kagel and A. Roth (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, 195-249.
Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with.. - Zwick, Rapoport (1999) (Correct)
....Battle of the Sexes game; the minimum and median coordination games investigated, respectively, by van Huyck, Battalio, Beil, 1990, 1991) to study coordination with no preplay communication in the controlled environment of the laboratory. Included in these games are market entry games (see Ochs, 1995, for a general review) whose purpose is to understand if and how competitive markets coordinate decentralized allocation decisions (e.g. Meyer, van Huyck, Battalio, Saving, 1992; Ochs, 1990; Rapoport, Seale, Erev, Sundali, 1998; Sundali, Rapoport, Seale, 1995) The choice of market entry ....
....consistent with the symmetric Nash equilibrium hypothesis (1995, p. 235) Using subjects with previous experience, Meyer et al. report that such experienced subjects used historical precedents to coordinate on pure strategy equilibrium outcomes (1992, p. 315) However, as pointed out by Ochs (1995), this interpretation of the data is neither general nor by any means compelling. The aggregate data of Ochs can be reasonably interpreted as consistent with the probability of an agent selecting a particular market i being proportional to s i s i . Meyer et al. observed that under their linear ....
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Ochs, J. (1995). Coordination problems. In J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth (Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 195 -- 251.
Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive.. - Goeree, Holt (2000) (4 citations) (Correct)
....This prediction is violated in an intuitive manner, with row players choices responding to their own payoffs. In this context, the Nash mixedstrategy prediction only works by coincidence, when the payoffs are symmetric. 8 8 This anomaly is persistent when subjects play the game repeatedly. Ochs (1995) investigates a matching pennies game with an asymmetry similar to that of the middle game in Table 1, and the row player s continue to select Top considerably more than one half of the time, even after as many as fifty rounds. These results are replicated in McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber (1997) ....
Ochs, Jack (1995) "Coordination Problems," in J. Kagel and A. Roth (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, 195-249.
Adaptive Learning and Emergent Coordination in Minority.. - Bottazzi, Devetag, Dosi.. (2001) (Correct)
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Ochs, J. (1995) Coordination problems, in J.H.Kagel and A.E. Roth (Eds.) Handbook of experimental economics, Princeton: princeton University Press, pp. 195-251.
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