G. R. Blakely. Safeguarding cryptographic keys. In Proc. of the Natl. Computer Conf., volume 48 of American Federation of Information Processing Societies Proceedings, 1979.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....scientists of which they are not a member, and there are (s ) 252 such groups. Therefore, each scientist must hold at least 252 keys. These numbers are clearly impractical, and they become exponentially worse when the number of scientists increases. The development of secret sharing schemes [41, 5] provided a better solution to this type of problem. Informally, a secret sharing scheme is a method of sharing a secret (for example, a lock combination) amongst a set of participants A such that only authorized subsets of participants can, by pooling their shares, recover the secret. Secret ....

G. Blakely. Safeguarding Cryptographic Keys. In Proceedings of the AFIPS National Computer Conference, pages 313-317, 1979.

.... 1, where V i denotes the set of shares of participant P i , S denotes the set of secrets, and ffi denotes the cheating probability. We next present an optimum scheme which meets the equality of our bound by using difference sets. 1 Introduction (k; n) threshold secret sharing schemes [2, 3] have been studied extensively so far because of their wide applications in fields, like key management and secure computation. In such a scheme, a dealer D distributes a secret s to n participants P 1 ; Pn in such a way that any k or more participants can recover the secret s but any k ....

G.R. Blakely. "Safeguarding cryptographic keys". In Proc. of the AFIPS 1979 National Computer Conference, vol.48, pages 313--317, 1979.

....This is a more sharp lower bound on j V i j for not uniformly distributed S. Our proof makes it intuitively clear why j V i j must be so large. Next, we extend our technique to show that max i log 2 j V i j 1:5 log 2 j Sj for some access structure. 1 Introduction A secret sharing scheme [1][2] is a method in which a dealer distributes a secret s to a set of users in such a way that only qualified subsets of users 1 can recover the secret s. Such a scheme is called perfect if any non qualified subset has absolutely no information on s. A piece v i given to user i is called a share. ....

G.R. Blakely. "Safeguarding cryptographic keys ". In Proc. of the AFIPS 1979.

....revealing them. We prove that the SUBSHARES VALID and SHARES VALID conditions are necessary and sufficient to guarantee that the new shareholders generate valid shares of the original secret. 2 Related work Blakley and Shamir invented secret sharing schemes independently. In Blakley s scheme [2], the intersection of m of n vector spaces yields a one dimensional vector that corresponds to the secret. Desmedt presents a survey of other sharing schemes [7] Feldman s VSS scheme [9] is one of several to catch a dealer that attempts to distribute invalid shares. Chor et al. present a scheme in ....

G. R. Blakely. Safeguarding cryptographic keys. In Proc. of the Natl. Computer Conf., volume 48 of American Federation of Information Processing Societies Proceedings, 1979.

.... (jSj 1) 1, where V i denotes the set of shares of participant P i , S denotes the set of secrets, and denotes the cheating probability. We next present an optimum scheme which meets the equality of our bound by using di erence sets. 1 Introduction (k; n) threshold secret sharing schemes [2, 3] have been studied extensively so far because of their wide applications in elds, like key management and secure computation. In such a scheme, a dealer D distributes a secret s to n participants P 1 ; Pn in such a way that any k or more participants can recover the secret s but any k 0 ....

G.R. Blakely. \Safeguarding cryptographic keys". In Proc. of the AFIPS

.... setting with n 5t, terminates after R rounds with a probability of reaching DA of at least 1 Gamma 2 Gamma R Gamma1 2 , using messages of size Theta(log n) 3 Reconstructible Secret Sharing The idea of secret sharing was introduced by Shamir [19] and independently by Blakely [3]. 2 A dealer privately sends a piece of a secret message to each processor in a network of n processors, at most t of which are bad. Assuming n 2t 1, any piece by itself is useless; however, any collection of n Gamma t = t 1 pieces may be used to recover the secret. Therefore, the secret ....

G. Blakely, "Safeguarding Cryptographic Keys," Proc. AFIPS, Vol. 48, pp. 313-317, NCC, June 1979.

....This is a more sharp lower bound on j V i j for not uniformly distributed S. Our proof makes it intuitively clear why j V i j must be so large. Next, we extend our technique to show that max i log 2 j V i j 1:5 log 2 j Sj for some access structure. 1 Introduction A secret sharing scheme [1][2] is a method in which a dealer distributes a secret s to a set of users in such a way that only qualified subsets of users 1 can recover the secret s. Such a scheme is called perfect if any non qualified subset has absolutely no information on s. A piece v i given to user i is called a share. ....

G.R. Blakely. "Safeguarding cryptographic keys ". In Proc. of the AFIPS 1979 National Computer Conference, vol.48, pages 313--317, 1979. 8

....members of a group of size n (and any number of non member failures) provided that n 3t 1 [9] 1 As described in Section IV, however, this is not the only factor limiting the fault tolerance of our auction protocol. B. Threshold secret sharing schemes A (t; n) threshold secret sharing scheme [10], 11] is, informally, a method of breaking a secret s into n shares sh 1 (s) shn (s) so that t 1 shares are sufficient to reconstruct s but t or fewer shares yield no information about s. In this paper, we make use of the polynomial based secret sharing scheme due to Shamir [11] In ....

G. R. Blakely, "Safeguarding cryptographic keys", in Proceedings of the AFIPS National Computer Conference, 1979, pp. 313--317.

.... protocols (cf. DGS85, Her84, JM90] name servers (cf. MV88] and selective dissemination of information (cf. YG94] We apply some recent constructions suggested in [NW94, PW95] Secret sharing: Secret sharing was originally suggested for threshold access structures by Shamir and Blakely [Sha79, Bla79]. It was extended to arbitrary access structures in [ISN87] The issue of efficiency (i.e. share sizes) of such schemes has been considered in several papers (cf. BD90, BDGV92, BC92] Schemes suggested in [BL88] for structures represented by monotone formulas turn out to be important for our ....

G. R. Blakely. Safeguarding cryptographic keys. Proc. AFIPS, NCC, 48:313--317, 1979.

.... data replication protocols (cf. 8, 19, 23] name servers (cf. 32] and selective dissemination of information (cf. 44] We apply some recent constructions suggested in [33, 37] Secret sharing: Secret sharing was originally suggested for threshold access structures by Shamir and Blakely [40, 4]. It was extended to arbitrary access structures in [22] The issue of efficiency (i.e. share sizes) of such schemes has been considered in several papers (cf. 6, 5, 2] Schemes suggested in [3] for structures represented by monotone formulas turn out to be important for our quorum systems. The ....

G. R. Blakely. Safeguarding cryptographic keys. Proc. AFIPS, NCC, 48:313--317, 1979.

....1) ffi 1, where V i denotes the set of shares of participant P i , S denotes the set of secrets, and ffi denotes the cheating probability. We next present an optimum scheme which meets the equality of our bound by using difference sets. 1 Introduction (k; n) threshold secret sharing schemes [2, 3] have been studied extensively so far because of their wide applications in fields, like key management and secure computation. In such a scheme, a dealer D distributes a secret s to n participants P 1 ; Pn in such a way that any k or more participants can recover the secret s but any k ....

G.R. Blakely. "Safeguarding cryptographic keys". In Proc. of the AFIPS 1979 National Computer Conference, vol.48, pages 313--317, 1979.

....fewer will recover it. This scheme is called a (k; l) treshold scheme. If l Gamma k pieces of information are lost then the key can still be reconstructed and no fewer than k pieces of information can reveal the key to an unauthorized user. The first shared secret schemes were devised by Blakley [1] and Shamir [15] to have robust keys for cryptosystems. Shamir s scheme is the more intuitively appealing and so we give a brief explanation, following Simmons [16] The S 3 is of the (k; l) threshold type. There is a polynomial P k Gamma1 (x) of degree k Gamma 1, and the secret is the point ....

G.R. Blakely, "Safeguarding cryptographics keys," Proc. AFIPS 1979 Natl. Computer Conf., New York, vol. 48, pp. 313--317, June 1979.

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G. R. Blakely. Safeguarding cryptographic keys. In Proc. of the Natl. Computer Conf., volume 48 of American Federation of Information Processing Societies Proceedings, 1979.

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