Glazer, J. and A. Rubinstein #1998#, #Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 79, pp. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design - Naor, Pinkas, Sumner (1999) (70 citations) (Correct)
....values for several options and decides on the option with the highest sum. It is, therefore, simple to provide a private protocol which computes these mechanisms. Another relevant application is the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions of a group of independent experts. Glazer and Rubinstein [15] observe that in a culture in which experts care that their recommendations are accepted, there is a mechanism with a single equilibrium which achieves the public target (and such a mechanism does not exist if experts only care about the public good) The mechanism they suggest can be computed ....
J. Glazer and A. Rubinstein, "Motives and implementation: on the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions", J. of Economic Theory 79, 157--173, 1998.
A Crash Course in Implementation Theory - Jackson (1997) (9 citations) (Correct)
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Glazer, J. and A. Rubinstein #1998#, #Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 79, pp.
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