R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and C. M. Kahn, "Protecting the winner: second price vs. ascending bid auctions", Economic Letters, Vol. 35, 1991, 243--248. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles |
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Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design - Naor, Pinkas, Sumner (1999) (70 citations) (Correct)
....higher than the final bid of the second highest bidder. The sealed bid second price auction requires less interaction and is therefore easier to run, but its main disadvantage is that unlike the English auction, the bid (i.e. the valuation) of the highest bidder is revealed to the auctioneer [11]. A corrupt auctioneer may take advantage of this information, either in future auctions or by reneging on the sale. In fact, a corrupt auctioneer can also take advantage of learning the bids of the other (non winning) bidders. The scheme that we introduce hides even that information from the ....
R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and C. M. Kahn, "Protecting the winner: second price vs. ascending bid auctions", Economic Letters, Vol. 35, 1991, 243--248.
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