C. Cachin, "Efficient Private Bidding and Auctions with an Oblivious Third Party," in 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security, pp. 120--127, 1999. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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A Second-price Sealed-bid Auction with Verifiable Discriminant .. - Omote, Miyaji (2003) (1 citation) (Correct)
....auction, a bidder who offers the highest price gets a good in the highest price. However, a bidder does not have the dominant strategy (optimal strategy) in this auction type, so a winning bid may be much higher or much lower. There are many studies on an electronic first price sealed bid auction[2, 5, 8 10, 12 18]. On the other hand, in a second price sealed bid auction, a bidder who offers the highest price gets a good in the second highest price. This style of auction has the incentive compatibility. The dominant strategy for each bidder is to place a bid honestly her his own true value[19] So it works ....
C. Cachin. "Efficient Private Bidding and Auctions with an Oblivious Third Party". In Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 120-127, 1999.
Private Auctions with Multiple Rounds and Multiple Items - Sadeghi, Schunter.. (Correct)
....a share of a secret sharing polynomial encoding her bid. Another protocol [10] uses general public key cryptography and focuses on the time dependent application of the auction rule. Unfortunately full trust in three auction servers is needed to guarantee privacy of the bids. The protocol in [5] uses a primitive solving the millionaire s problem [16] to implement a sealed bid first price auction with two semi trusted auction servers which only outputs the winner. But one server learns a partial order of the bids, and interaction between the bidders is needed. The only primitive the ....
C. Cachin. Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party. 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), ACM Press, New York 1999, 120-127.
Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust - Lipmaa, Asokan, Niemi (2002) (12 citations) (Correct)
....followed by some discussion in Section 7. We compare our schemes with the Naor Pinkas Sumner scheme in 8, and conclude the paper in Section 9. 2 State of the Art We will briefly survey the known cryptographic Vickrey auction schemes that do not rely on the threshold trust. A few auction schemes [Cac99,BS01] are based on the Yao s millionaire s problem. Such schemes avoid threshold trust by using an oblivious third party for bid comparison. Without a collusion between the seller and the third party, the seller will get to know some partial order among the bids but not the bid values themselves. While ....
Christian Cachin. Efficient Private Bidding and Auctions with an Oblivious Third Party. In 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 120--127, Singapore, 1--4 November 1999. ACM Press.
Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design - Naor, Pinkas, Sumner (1999) (70 citations) (Correct)
.... auctioneer among several servers, and privacy is guaranteed as long as not too many of the servers collude (most of the protocols require that less than a third of the servers collude, and therefore need a minimum of four servers) A different auction scheme was suggested very recently by Cachin [5], involving two auction servers, but requiring users to contact just a single server. After receiving the bids, the auction servers engage in several rounds of communication, at the end of which they have a list of the bidders sorted by their bids, but not the bids themselves. The systems of [14, ....
....the bids, the auction servers engage in several rounds of communication, at the end of which they have a list of the bidders sorted by their bids, but not the bids themselves. The systems of [14, 21] require bidders to communicate directly with all the servers. Furthermore, the systems of [21, 5] require high interactivity between the servers which exchange numerous rounds of interaction. These requirements impose bandwidth and latency problems on all the auction servers. There is no motivation for a global party such as the auction issuer to participate as a server in many auctions, as a ....
C. Cachin, "Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party", to appear, Proc. 6th ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security, 1999.
Design Issues For Electronic Auctions - Jarrod Trevathan And (2004) (Correct)
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C. Cachin, "Efficient Private Bidding and Auctions with an Oblivious Third Party," in 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security, pp. 120--127, 1999.
Two-Party Private Vector Dominance: The All-Or-Nothing Deal - Maged Hamada Ibrahim (Correct)
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C. Cachin, "Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party," In 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 1999, pp. 120--127.
Reconciling Cooperation with Confidentiality in.. - Machiraju, Katz (2004) (Correct)
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C. Cachin. Efficient Private Bidding and Auctions with an Oblivious Third Party. In Proc. of ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 1999.
Identity-based Chameleon Hash and Applications - Ateniese, de Medeiros (2003) (5 citations) (Correct)
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Cachin, C.: Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party. In: 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), ACM Press (1999) 120--127
Design Issues for Electronic Auctions - Trevathan, Ghodosi, Read (2005) (Correct)
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C. Cachin, "Efficient Private Bidding and Auctions with an Oblivious Third Party," in 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security, pp. 120--127, 1999.
Literature Review - Trevathan (2004) (Correct)
No context found.
Christian Cachin. Efficient Private Bidding and Auctions with an Oblivious Third Party. In Proceedings of 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 120-127, 1999.
Identity-based Chameleon Hash and Applications - Ateniese, de Medeiros (2004) (5 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
Cachin, C.: Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party. In: 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), ACM Press (1999) 120--127
Design Issues for Electronic Auctions - Trevathan, Ghodosi, Read (2005) (Correct)
No context found.
Christian Cachin. Efficient Private Bidding and Auctions with an Oblivious Third Party. In Proceedings of 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 120-127, 1999.
An Efficient Protocol for Yao's Millionaires' Problem - Ioannis Ioannidis And (1 citation) (Correct)
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Christian Cachin, Efficient Private Bidding and Auctions with an Oblivious Third Party,Proc.6thACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 1999. p. 120 - 126
An Anonymous and Secure Continuous Double Auction Scheme - Trevathan, Ghodosi, Read (2005) (Correct)
No context found.
Christian Cachin. Efficient Private Bidding and Auctions with an Oblivious Third Party. In Proceedings of 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 120-127, 1999.
An Efficient Protocol for Yao's Millionaires' Problem - Ioannis Ioannidis And (1 citation) (Correct)
No context found.
Christian Cachin, Efficient Private Bidding and Auctions with an Oblivious Third Party, Proc. 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 1999. p. 120 - 126
From Call For Tenders To Sealed-Bid Auction For Mediated.. - Tafreschi, Schneider (2001) (Correct)
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Christian Cachin. Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party. In 5th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, November 1999.
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