(Enter summary)
Abstract: Coalition formation is one of the key problems in multiagent
systems. One would prefer a coalition structure
that maximizes the sum of the values of the coalitions,
but often the number of coalition structures is
too large to allow exhaustive search for the optimal
one. This paper focuses on finding a worst case bound
on how good the optimal coalition structure is compared
to the best coalition structure that a nonexhaustive
search finds.
We show that none of the previous coalition structure... (Update)
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BibTeX entry: (Update)
@misc{ on-worstcaseoptimal,
author = "Ti On",
title = "Worst-Case-Optimal Anytime Coalition Structure Generation",
url = "citeseer.ist.psu.edu/76934.html" }
Citations (may not include all citations):
99
Rules of Encounter (context) - Rosenschein, Zlotkin - 1994
54
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
- Sandholm, Lesser - 1997
32
Forming coalitions in the face of uncertain rewards
- Ketchpel - 1994
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Theories of Coalition Formation (context) - Kahan, Rapoport - 1984
28
A kernel-oriented model for coalition-formation in general e..
- Shehory, Kraus - 1996
23
cryptography and stability: Mechanisms for coalition formati.. (context) - Zlotkin, Rosenschein - 1994
22
Microeconomic Theory (context) - Mas-Colell, Whinston et al. - 1995
20
Coalitionproof Nash equilibria: I concepts (context) - Bernheim, Peleg et al. - 1987
20
Acceptable points in general cooperative nperson games (context) - Aumann - 1959
7
The Economics of Electronic Commerce (context) - Choi, Stahl et al. - 1997
5
Coalition-proof Nash equilibria: II applications (context) - Bernheim, Whinston - 1987
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Task allocation via coalition formation among autonomous age.. (context) - on, of et al. - 1995
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