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Towards a Formal Treatment of Secrecy against Computational Adversaries  (Make Corrections)  
Angelo Troina, Alessandro Aldini, Roberto Gorrieri



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Abstract: Polynomial time adversaries based on a computational view of cryptography have additional capabilities that the classical Dolev-Yao adversary model does not include. To relate these two di#erent models of cryptography, in this paper we enrich a formal model for cryptographic expressions, originally based on the Dolev-Yao assumptions, with computational aspects based on notions of probability and computational power. The obtained result is that if the cryptosystem is robust enough, then... (Update)

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0.9:   Approximating Imperfect Cryptography in a Formal Model - Troina, Aldini, al. (2003)   (Correct)
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BibTeX entry:   (Update)

@misc{ troina-towards,
  author = "Angelo Troina and Alessandro Aldini and Roberto Gorrieri",
  title = "Towards a Formal Treatment of Secrecy against Computational Adversaries",
  url = "citeseer.ist.psu.edu/764473.html" }
Citations (may not include all citations):
404   A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols: The Spi Calculus - Abadi, Gordon - 1999
263   The Inductive Approach to Verifying Cryptographic Protocols - Paulson - 1998
114   A Probabilistic Poly-Time Framework for Protocol Analysis - Lincoln, Mitchell et al. - 1998
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33   Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Sou.. - Abadi, Rogaway - 2000
33   Semantics and Program Analysis of Computationally Secure Inf.. - Laud - 2001
29   Approximate Non-Interference - Di Pierro, Hankin et al. - 2002
21   A Compiler for Analysing Cryptographic Protocols Using Non-I.. (context) - Durante, Focardi et al. - 2000
18   A Process-algebraic Approach for the Analysis of Probabilist.. (context) - Aldini, Bravetti et al. - 2004
16   Computational Probabilistic Non-interference - Backes, Pfitzmann - 2002
15   Probabilistic Bisimulation and Equivalence for Security Anal.. - Ramanathan, Mitchell et al. - 2004
10   Completeness Theorems for the Abadi-Rogaway Language of Encr.. - Micciancio, Warinschi - 2002
9   A Computational Interpretation of Dolev-Yao Adversaries - Herzog - 2003
7   Two Formal Approaches for Approximating Noninterference Prop.. - Aldini, Bravetti et al. - 2004
7   A Note on the Perfect Encryption Assumption in a Process Cal.. (context) - Zunino, Degano - 2004
5   A Probabilistic Formulation of Imperfect Cryptography - Troina, Aldini et al. - 2003
4   Unifying Equivalence-Based Definitions of Protocol Security - Datta, Kusters et al. - 2004
http://mefisto.web.cs.unibo.it/pubbl.html

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