(Enter summary)
Abstract: We prove the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol secure
under real, active cryptographic attacks including concurrent protocol runs. This
proof is based on an abstract cryptographic library, which is a provably secure abstraction
of a real cryptographic library. Together with composition and integrity
preservation theorems from the underlying model, this allows us to perform the
actual proof effort in a deterministic setting corresponding to a slightly extended
Dolev-Yao model. (Update)
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BibTeX entry: (Update)
M. Backes and B. P tzmann. A cryptographically sound security proof of the needhamschroeder -lowe public-key protocol. In 23rd Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS), Mumbai, India, December 2003. http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/article/backes03cryptographically.html More
@misc{ backes03cryptographically,
author = "M. Backes and B. tzmann",
title = "A cryptographically sound security proof of the needhamschroeder -lowe
public-key protocol",
text = "M. Backes and B. P tzmann. A cryptographically sound security proof of
the needhamschroeder -lowe public-key protocol. In 23rd Conference on Foundations
of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS), Mumbai,
India, December 2003.",
year = "2003",
url = "citeseer.ist.psu.edu/article/backes03cryptographically.html" }
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The graph only includes citing articles where the year of publication is known.
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