THE BNAI ANALYZER: A TOOL FOR VERIFYING ADMISSIBLE INFORMATION FLOW IN PROTOCOLS
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by G. Hains, M. Bergeron
ftp://ftp-lifo.univ-orleans.fr/pub/Users/ghains/pdcs2002.ps.gz
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Abstract:
We present a tool for verifying a new security property of protocols namely bisimulation-based non-deterministic admissible interference or BNAI. This property specifies the absence of information flow from confidential channels to public ones in selected parts of the protocol's execution. The tool's first version applies to protocols described by finite-state communicating processes and outputs detailed diagnostics in the case of inadmissible information flow. Examples illustrate the difficulty of ensuring the BNAI property by visual inspection of the protocol's transition system and hence the tools usefulness. Future versions will apply to families of infinite-state processes and one of them is outlined here. 1
Citations
| 1 | ACID-unification, rewrite reachability and set constraints – ANANTHARAMAN, NARENDRAN, et al. - 2002 |
| 1 | Syst emes de Transitions Finis et S emantique des Processus Communicants – ARNOLD - 1992 |
| 1 | The concurrency workbench, in Automatic Verification of Finite State Systems – CLEAVELAND, PARROW, et al. |
