Generous and greedy strategies (1998) [5 citations — 3 self]
|
Popular Tags
No tags have been applied to this document.
BibTeX | Add To MetaCart
@INPROCEEDINGS{Carlsson98generousand,author = {Bengt Carlsson and Stefan Johansson and Magnus Boman},
title = {Generous and greedy strategies},
booktitle = {In Proceedings of Complex Systems 98},
year = {1998}
}
Years of Citing Articles
Abstract:
We introduce generous, even-matched, and greedy strategies as concepts for analyzing games. A two person prisoner's dilemma game is described by the four outcomes (C,D), (C,C), (D,C), and (D,D). In a generous strategy the proportion of (C,D) is larger than that of (D,C), i.e. the probability of facing a defecting agent is larger than the probability of defecting. An even-matched strategy has the (C,D) proportion approximately equal to that of (D,C). A greedy strategy is an inverted generous strategy. The basis of the partition is that it is a zero-sum game given that the sum of the proportions of strategies (C,D) must equal that of (D,C). In a population simulation, we compare the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game with the chicken game (CG), given complete as well as partial knowledge of the rules for moves in the other strategies. In a traffic intersection example, we expected a co-operating generous strategy to be successful when the cost for collision was high in addition to the presence of uncertainty. The simulation indeed showed that a generous strategy was successful in the CG part, in which agents faced uncertainty about the outcome. If the resulting zero-sum game is changed from a PD game to a CG, or if the noise level is increased, it will favor generous strategies rather than an even-matched or greedy strategies.
