(Enter summary)
Abstract: Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are
desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability
between the items. However, expressing one's preferences can require
bidding on all bundles. Selective incremental preference elicitation by the auctioneer
was recently proposed to address this problem [4], but the idea was not
evaluated. In this paper we show, experimentally and theoretically, that automated
elicitation provides a... (Update)
Context of citations to this paper: More
...for free, that is, their valuation functions are monotone. However, experimentally, preference elicitation appears to help quite a bit [9]. Nonetheless, the amount of querying can be prohibitively large when the bidders have general (monotone) preferences. An analogous issue...
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BibTeX entry: (Update)
Benoit Hudson and Tuomas Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002. Extended version: Carnegie Mellon University, Computer Science Department, CMU-CS-02-124, March. Also: Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics workshop (SITE02) . 10 http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/article/hudson02effectiveness.html More
@misc{ hudson02effectiveness,
author = "B. Hudson and T. Sandholm",
title = "Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions",
text = "Benoit Hudson and Tuomas Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation
in combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic
Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002. Extended version: Carnegie Mellon
University, Computer Science Department, CMU-CS-02-124, March. Also: Stanford
Institute for Theoretical Economics workshop (SITE02) . 10",
year = "2002",
url = "citeseer.ist.psu.edu/article/hudson02effectiveness.html" }
Citations (may not include all citations):
215
Multipart pricing of public goods (context) - Clarke - 1971
184
Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions
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184
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial ..
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177
An implementation of the contract net protocol based on marg..
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147
Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auction.. (context) - Fujishima, Leyton-Brown et al. - 1999
128
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
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76
CABOB: A fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions
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69
Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice
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63
Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determi..
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51
eMediator: A next generation electronic commerce server
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37
Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation proble..
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34
Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions
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32
anonymous-price combinatorial auction (context) - Wurman, Wellman et al. - 2000
29
Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions
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29
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction alg.. (context) - Leyton-Brown, Pearson et al. - 2000
27
Why are Vickrey auctions rare (context) - Rothkopf, Teisberg et al. - 1990
23
Linear programming and Vickrey auctions
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17
The communication complexity of efficient allocation problem..
- Nisan, Segal - 2002
10
Constructing and clearing combinatorial exchanges using pref..
- Smith, Sandholm et al. - 2002
4
Deliberation in equilibrium: Bargaining in computationally c..
- Larson, Sandholm - 2000
3
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1
A more detailed description of the algorithmic aspects appea.. (context) - Conen, Sandholm et al. - 2001
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