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Abstract: Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. However, expressing one's preferences can require bidding on all bundles. Selective incremental preference elicitation by the auctioneer was recently proposed to address this problem [4], but the idea was not evaluated. In this paper we show, experimentally and theoretically, that automated elicitation provides a drastic... (Update)
Context of citations to this paper: More
...for free, that is, their valuation functions are monotone. However, experimentally, preference elicitation appears to help quite a bit [9]. Nonetheless, the amount of querying can be prohibitively large when the bidders have general (monotone) preferences. An analogous issue...
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BibTeX entry: (Update)
Benoit Hudson and Tuomas Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), Bologna, Italy, 2002. Extended version: Carnegie Mellon University, Computer Science Department, CMU-CS-02-124, March. Also: Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics workshop (SITE02) . 10 http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/article/hudson02effectiveness.html More
@inproceedings{ hudson02effectiveness,
author = "Beno\^{\i}t Hudson and Tuomas Sandholm",
title = "Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions",
booktitle = "AAMAS-02 workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC)",
pages = "69--86",
year = "2002",
note = "Extended version: Carnegie Mellon University, Computer Science
Department, CMU-CS-02-124, March. Also:
Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics workshop (SITE-02)",
url = "citeseer.ist.psu.edu/article/hudson02effectiveness.html" }
Citations (may not include all citations):215 Multipart pricing of public goods (context) - Clarke - 1971
214 Incentives in teams (context) - Groves - 1973
184 Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial .. - Sandholm - 2002
184 Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions - Rothkopf, Pekec et al. - 1998
177 An implementation of the contract net protocol based on marg.. - Sandholm - 1993
174 and competitive sealed tenders (context) - Vickrey, auctions - 1961
147 Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auction.. (context) - Fujishima, Leyton-Brown et al. - 1999
128 Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions - Nisan - 2000
85 Combinatorial auctions: A survey - de Vries, Vohra - 2000
76 CABOB: A fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions - Sandholm, Suri et al. - 2001
69 Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice - Parkes, Ungar - 2000
63 Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determi.. - Andersson, Tenhunen et al. - 2000
51 eMediator: A next generation electronic commerce server - Sandholm - 2000
40 Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions: Extended a.. - Conen, Sandholm - 2001
38 iBundle: An efficient ascending price bundle auction - Parkes - 1999
37 Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation proble.. - Parkes - 1999
36 Some tractable combinatorial auctions - Tennenholtz - 2000
34 Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions - Conen, Sandholm - 2002
29 Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions - Hoos, Boutilier - 2001
27 Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction alg.. - Leyton-Brown, Pearson et al. - 2000
27 Preventing strategic manipulation in iterative auctions: Pro.. - Parkes, Ungar - 2000
27 Why are Vickrey auctions rare (context) - Rothkopf, Teisberg et al. - 1990
23 Linear programming and Vickrey auctions - Bikhchandani, de Vries et al. - 2001
22 Issues in computational Vickrey auctions (context) - Sandholm - 2000
17 The communication complexity of efficient allocation problem.. - Nisan, Segal - 2002
15 Computationally limited agents in auctions - Larson, Sandholm - 2001
12 Mechanism design for computerized agents (context) - Varian - 1995
5 Costly valuation computation in auctions: Deliberation equil.. (context) - Larson, Sandholm - 2001
5 anonymousprice combinatorial auction (context) - Wurman, Wellman et al. - 2000
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