Rapid development of networks and communications makes security a more and more crucial problem. To provide security for di erent systems, many communication security protocols are proposed. Such protocols must be proved correct before they can be used in practice. Formal veri cation techniques are promising methods to verify protocols and have been receiving a lot of attention recently. In this paper, we survey several security protocols and formal veri cation techniques to verify the protocols.
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