Proving secrecy is easy enough (2001) [19 citations — 1 self]
Abstract:
We develop a systematic proof procedure for establishing secrecy results for cryptographic protocols. Part of the procedure is to reduce messages to simplified constituents, and its core is a search procedure for establishing secrecy results. This procedure is sound but incomplete in that it may fail to establish secrecy for some secure protocols. However, it is amenable to mechanization, and it also has a convenient visual representation. We demonstrate the utility of our procedure with secrecy proofs for standard benchmarks such as the Yahalom protocol. 1
Citations
| 176 | A Survey of Authentication Protocol Literature: Version 1.0 – Clark, Jacob - 1997 |
| 128 | A meta-notation for protocol analysis – Cervesato, Durgin, et al. - 1999 |
| 106 | Undecidability of bounded security protocols – Durgin, Lincoln, et al. - 1999 |
| 32 | TAPS: A first-order verifier for cryptographic protocols – Cohen - 2000 |
| 24 | Using a PVS embedding of CSP to verify authentication protocols – Dutertre, Schneider - 1997 |

