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by Matthew Hennessy, James Riely
http://www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/users/matthewh/icalp00.ps
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Abstract:

Abstract. We propose an extension of the asynchronous-calculus in which a variety of security properties may be captured using types. These are an extension of the Input/Output types for the-calculus in which I/O capabilities are assigned specific security levels. We define a typing system which ensures that processes running at security level oe cannot access resources with a security level higher than oe. The notion of access control guaranteed by this system is formalized in terms of a Type Safety theorem. We then show that, for a certain class of processes, our system prohibits implicit information flow from high-level to low-level processes. We prove that low-level behaviour can not be influenced by changes to high-level behaviour. This is formalized as a Non-Interference Theorem with respect to may testing. 1

Citations

412 Secure computer systems: Unified exposition and multics interpretation – BELL, LAPADULA - 1976
227 Secrecy by typing in security protocols – ABADI - 1997
29 Static analysis of processes for no read-up and no write-down – Bodei, Degano, et al. - 1999
20 Control flow analysis for the -calculus – Bodei, Degano, et al. - 1998